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The purpose of this study was to examine the relations among culture, information 
sharing, and performance among culturally-homogeneous NATO Officer teams. Forty-eight 
teams participated from five countries, namely, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and 
USA. Teams of four participants were randomly assigned to a role and the task was an 
interdependent computer-based mission using an adapted version of Neverwinter Nights™ 
(Bioware, 2003), where they had to communicate among teammates and with non-human players 
to find weapons caches and other mission objectives. Not one individual had all of the 
information needed to perform the tasks; thus, they needed to share information with each other. 
The results of the study suggested that total information sharing was related to both team 
performance and cultural values (Power Distance, Individualism, and Uncertainty Avoidance). 
Specifically, Situation Update was the information sharing dimension that was significantly 
related to team performance. In addition, culture moderated the relations between information 
sharing and team performance. Specifically, there were hypotheses regarding Individualism 
moderating the relations between (a) Supporting Behavior, (b) Information Exchange, and (c) 
Reinforcement / Punishment and team performance. The results were that for high Individualists, 
the more supporting behavior, the better the teams performed. For low Individualists, the more 
supporting behavior, the worse the teams performed —a finding that was in the opposite 
direction than hypothesized. In support of the hypotheses, for high Individualists, as Information 
Exchange and Reinforcement / Punishment increased, team performance also increased. 
Conversely, for low Individualists, as Information Exchange and Reinforcement / Punishment 
increased, team performance decreased. A Task Direction x Power Distance interaction was also 




Power Distance teams. For low-Power Distance teams, an increase in task direction was 
associated with a decrease in team performance. In addition, the effective teams exchanged more 
information and communicated similarly during the beginning, middle, and end of the missions. 
Moreover, high-Individualist teams were more successful and spent more time communicating 
about Planning in the beginning, and Situation Update for both the middle and end of the task. In 
contrast, teams low on Individualism spent more time communicating about Planning for all 
three phases of the task. There were also interesting rank differences in Information Sharing 
between senior and junior Norwegian Officers that are noteworthy. Study limitations, 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Currently, organizations are adopting innovative ways to restructure their organizational 
layout to respond to globalization, competition, and technological advances.  One commonly-
noted solution is to synchronize human capital by forming teams.   Teams are defined as “two or 
more people assigned specific roles or functions to perform dynamically, interdependently, and 
adaptively toward a common and valued goal, object, and mission” (Salas & Fiore, 2004 as cited 
in Johnson et al., 2007, p. 437).  Using teams, organizations have been able to accomplish 
cognitively-demanding tasks that require more than one individual (e.g., decision making, 
customer service; Bell, 2007; Johnson et al., 2007).  The extensive use of teams in the 1990s has 
resulted in flattened-organizational hierarchies, increased flexibility, and improved net profits for 
the organization (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999; Johnson et al., 2007).  To understand this new 
paradigm, researchers have attempted to diagnose predictors of effective team performance.  
Research conducted in recent decades have contributed to the “golden age” of team research 
(Salas, Cooke, & Rosen, 2008, p. 541), with Salas and colleagues (2007) citing as much as 130 
models, frameworks, or components of teamwork.  And although their presence has consumed 
the industrial / organizational psychology domain, the extant models of teamwork do not 
sufficiently address teams whose members are not from Western societies or teams with a 
heterogeneous cultural composition (Salas, Cooke, & Rosen, 2008). 
Nowhere have we seen more changes in how work is organized in response to 
environmental changes than in the U. S. military.   The military’s shift to smaller, highly-
coordinated teams was primarily used for mission success (e.g., combat teams, training teams, 
 
2 
and quality teams; Knouse, 2001; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, Church-Payne, & Smith-Jentsch, 
1998), though multinational coalition teams have proven to be more useful with the dawn of the 
21
st
 Century.  The September 11, 2001 attacks and the subsequent global war on terror have 
required a major shift in how the military organizes work.  No longer do the missions enunciate 
clear military objectives, nor is mission success solely defined by utilizing traditional weaponry 
and kinetic forces to seize territory and thwart the enemy strategy in nation-to-nation warfare, as 
expected in industrial war (Essens & van Loon, 2008; McGinn, Weaver, McDonald, van Driel, 
& Hancock, 2008).  Instead, the current military is faced with more complex missions, requiring 
a new approach that involves all command levels understanding the non-U.S. political and social 
challenges in influencing local leaders, governments, agencies, and Non-Governmental 
Organizations to foster a trusting environment conducive to nation building (Essens & van Loon, 
2008).  Further, not one individual possesses all of the information, nor one nation maintains all 
of the human and financial resources needed for contemporary, global military actions—thus, 
coordination with internal team members and multinational networks is critical for global 
warfighting and peacekeeping solutions.  Examples include counterinsurgency operations, 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief and Stability, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction (SSTR) missions that have been underway in Iraq and Afghanistan (Burke, 
Wilson, & Salas, 2008). The primary objective of SSTR missions and the focus of the most 
recent military training, is to “leave behind a stable indigenous population with the capacity to 
uphold law and maintain essential services, while developing a viable market economy and 
democratic political institutions” (p.497, Hughes, McCoy, & Johnston, 2009; Department of 
Defense, 2005)—demanding cooperation and collaboration, most often from multinational 
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coalition teams.  Missions in both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom 
have benefited from the military might of these multinational coalition teams.   
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for example, has supported coalition 
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. NATO is an alliance of 26 North American and European 
countries, which was established in 1949 (www.nato.int).  The mission of NATO is to 
“safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means” 
(www.nato.int), in accordance with the signed North Atlantic Treaty.  NATO Officers 
representing 12 countries (e.g., United States, United Kingdon, the Netherlands, Norway, Italy, 
Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Turkey, Canada, and Denmark) have supported the 
Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq by assisting the Iraqi government to train, 
mentor, and prepare its security forces (Zabaldo, 2004).  In Afghanistan, NATO’s role is “to 
assist the Afghan Government in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the 
country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance. It does this predominately 
through its UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force” (“NATO’s role in 
Afghanistan”, n.d.).  NATO’s operations are not narrowly focused in the Middle East.  More 
recently, NATO warships have been deployed off the shores of Somalia to reinforce the battle 
against pirates and to protect ships from the United Nations’ World Food Program delivering 
relief supplies to the country (Smith, 2010).  Thus, employing military teams to collaborate with 
culturally-diverse teams has been essential in maintaining an adaptive force.  
Although the armed forces have transitioned to using multinational configurations, it has 
underscored challenges within military operations.  This change has driven researchers to shift 
their attention to understanding effective multicultural collaboration.  One important issue is: 
how do we create effective teams when the people brought to the team have different abilities, 
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knowledge, skills, and even cultural backgrounds?  In this context, culturally-diverse teams 
pertain to individuals from different nations joining forces, with one specific definition of 
multicultural teams being “a collection of individuals, small in number, who have representatives 
from more than one national background among them, who are interdependent and mutually 
accountable for accomplishing a set of objectives, and who recognize themselves as a team” 
(Burke, Wilson, & Salas, p. 18-1, 2008; Gibson & Grubb, 2005).   
The existing research suggests that the use of heterogeneous team members can be 
advantageous to problem solving and team performance.  In theory, teams with diverse members 
have varied perspectives, and with this skill fusion, they should be able to effectively complete 
the team task (Knouse, 2001). “Diverse teams can also have greater cultural and language skills 
for deployment in international settings” (Knouse, 2001, p. 4; Cox, 1993; Keller, 2001; Simons, 
Pelled, & Smith, 1999; Thompson & Gooler, 1996).  
Conversely, heterogeneous teams can also pose certain disadvantages to team 
performance.  The same diversity that can allow for divergent views for more successful decision 
making can result in deficiencies in acknowledging the commonalities needed to establish 
cohesion, trust, communication, and coordination (Knouse, 2001).  In a nutshell, diverse teams 
may find it challenging to achieve mission success and team effectiveness (for a thorough review 
on the advantages and disadvantages of cultural diversity in teams, please refer to Stahl, 
Maznevski, Voigt, & Jonsen, 2010 and Stahl, Mäkelä, Zander, & Maznevski, 2010). 
Literature published within the past twenty-five years has found that effective team 
performance is dependent, in part, upon team members engaging in efficient information sharing 
(IS), which is “a central process through which team members collectively utilize their available 
informational resources” (Smith-Jentsch, et al, 2001).  Most of the literature on team 
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performance models is derived from studies conducted in the United States and Western 
populations (Salas, Cooke, & Rosen, 2008). The team research to date has suggested that teams 
share more information in three cases: when (a) all team members already know the information, 
(b) members are all able to make accurate decisions on their own, and (c) all members are highly 
similar to one another (Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009).  These results suggest that IS is 
likely to be a challenge for culturally-diverse teams. 
More recent research on multicultural or multinational teams has focused on those 
operating in overseas subsidiaries of multinational corporations, with participants being either 
locals, expatriates, or third country expatriates (e.g., Elron, 1997); those working in 
geographically distributed teams (e.g., Hinds & Mortensen, 2005); and those participating in 
global virtual teams (e.g., Riopelle et al., 2003).  However, to fully understand the multicultural 
team dynamic, one must focus on the unique team processes that occur within each culture (e.g., 
a team of all Chinese members compared to a team composed of only Brazilian members).   The 
prerequisite of gaining full appreciation of heterogeneous teams is to empirically compare 
homogeneous teams.   
To directly compare the performance of teams from different cultures, the members of 
the NATO Research Task Group 138 focusing on “Adaptability in Multinational Coalitions” 
conducted a computer-based experiment using the Situation Authorable Behavior Research 
Environment (BBN Technologies, 2006). Based on the computer game, “Neverwinter Nights™”, 
the experiment called for 56 four-person teams of volunteer NATO Officers and the computer-
based mission involved the collaboration of efforts to find simulated weapons caches while 
maintaining positive relationships with the local populace portrayed by avatars.  The participants 
were from five countries—eight teams from Bulgaria (32 individuals), eight teams from the 
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Netherlands (32 individuals), 16 teams from Norway (64 individuals), nine teams from Sweden 
(36 individuals), and seven teams from the United States (28 individuals). Additionally, there 
were also eight mixed-culture teams (32 individuals).  The scenario was developed to represent a 
true team task as the participants each had access to unshared information that would require 
information sharing to achieve their shared mission.  The main hypothesis proposed was that 
homogeneous-culture teams perform better than mixed-culture teams.  Although the preliminary 
analyses have been mixed, the Research Task Group did not specifically examine information 
sharing patterns (beyond frequency) among the in culturally-homogeneous teams—providing an 
important research opportunity for the current study.   
This study will expand the research on information sharing and team performance by 
enunciating a more sophisticated understanding of how this relation is moderated by culture.  
Specifically, I will examine the association between culture and information sharing in 
culturally-homogeneous teams from different countries.  In doing so, I will test the proposed 
model that specifies that the relation between information sharing content and team performance 






















The present study will examine similarities and differences in information sharing in a team 
performance task using teams from different cultures, which will offer several contributions.  
First, because all teams had the same team performance task, my study will be among the first to 
directly compare information sharing content on performance in teams across five different 
cultures. Second, because the participants are military personnel, they are a true representation of 
the population to which I wish to generalize. Finally, the countries included in this study differ 
on cultural values and at least one non-Western culture is represented in this sample, thereby 
making it possible to begin to examine whether traditional Western notions about the relation 
between information sharing and team performance apply to non-Western teams.   
In Chapter 2, the literature on information sharing that is related to team performance will 
be presented followed by an overview of culture in teams.  Then, research examining how 
culture affects team information sharing will be explained.  Finally, the chapter will conclude 





CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
It was July, 1988. U. S. Naval forces operating in the Persian Gulf were already notified 
from Intelligence reports that Iranians may be planning an attack on the United States around 
Independence Day.  These reports may have heightened the anticipation of U. S. Naval personnel 
and biased their observations and perceptions of benign events that would follow. 
On July 3, 1988, a helicopter operating on the USS Vincennes (a guided missile cruiser 
for the Navy) reported that Iranian gunboats fired in their direction, resulting in a gun battle with 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.  The gun battle increased noise levels and stress among 
the USS Vincennes operating personnel.  In turn, a Vincennes crewmember incorrectly identified 
an unknown aircraft as a threat.  The aircraft was positioned within the commercial air corridor, 
just not in the strictly-obeyed centerline traditionally taken by commercial planes flying in that 
air space.  Further, the aircraft appeared to be approaching the Vincennes.  The unidentified 
aircraft did not provide any data supporting its commercial status, multiple warnings were not 
answered, and no changes in course were acknowledged.  As a result of the correct, unknown, 
and incorrect information that was shared amongst the command information center of the 
Vincennes, the decision made was to fire at the aircraft.  As a result, the U. S. Navy was 
responsible for mistakenly shooting down an Iranian civilian aircraft over the Persian Gulf, 
killing 290 passengers.  The decision time span from takeoff to the disaster was only 7 minutes.   
The events that led to this fatal error have been well studied to design and implement 
training aimed at improving decision making under stressful situations for the military (Fogarty, 
1988; Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998).  The results of the investigation suggested that ineffective 
information sharing was a cause in the poor decision.   
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Many other military fatal accidents in history could be attributed to poor information 
sharing, especially when coordinating among international teams.  Further, current military 
missions are heavily focused on stability operations, requiring increased interactions with the 
local populace.  Our primary intelligence sources abroad are directly linked to the ability to 
negotiate, build relationships and foster trust with individuals from other cultures.  
Communicating in a cross-culturally appropriate way is a crucial skill that is gaining more 
research and practical attention for the U.S. military.  Furthermore, international coalition teams 
also operate to support the global war on terror. 
Although information sharing between international team members is vital for 
multinational cooperation and mission success abroad, few empirical studies have examined 
differences in communication patterns among teams outside of the United States.  Evaluating 
how Bulgarian team members interact with each other, for example, is a critical, preliminary step 
in understanding how Bulgarians would interact with teammates from Sweden, the United States, 
and Norway.  In other words, it is important to understand the unique, within-culture 
communication patterns that are utilized among homogeneous team members before 
extrapolating this information to mixed-culture teams.  Thus, the primary objective of this study 
is to examine information sharing patterns and team performance among culturally-
homogeneous teams from different nations.  In the following literature review, I will first discuss 
information sharing in teams and then introduce how culture will be expected to change this 
process.  These sections will provide the backbone for the study objectives and research 






 Century, the United States military services have transitioned into utilizing 
smaller, more highly coordinated teams (Salas, Cannon-Bowers, Church-Payne, & Smith-
Jentsch, 1998).  For clarity, a team is defined as “a distinguishable set of two or more people 
who interact, dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively toward a common and valued 
goal/objective/mission, who have each been assigned specific roles or functions to perform, and 
who have a limited life-span of membership” (Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-
Bowers, 2000, p. 273; Morgan, Glickman, Woodard, Blaiwes, & Salas, 1986; Smith-Jentsch, 
Mathieu, & Kraiger, 2005). Orasanu and Salas (Cox, 1993) provided the following 
characteristics of a team: “(a) teams make decisions in the context of a larger task; (b) team 
members have specialized knowledge and skills relevant to the task and decision; and (c) task 
conditions under which teams operate often include high workload and time pressure” (van Vliet 
& van Amelsfoort, 2008).  Teams are most useful when the tasks are complex so that members 
divide the work, monitor the performance of others, and build an expertise on some tasks 
(Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2000).    Further, the use of teams are 
advantageous in situations where, like in the military, collective insight is needed to make 
effective and expeditious decisions in order to prevent errors that would lead to severe 
consequences—specifically, when there are lives at stake (Salas, Cooke, & Rosen, 2008).  The 
use of decision-making teams is supposed to increase the likelihood of selecting the most 
effective decision in comparison to when the individuals are deciding a course of action without 
the collaboration of a team.  The major reason to expect better decision making is that members 
bring different information and resources to the team.  These different perspectives are then 
pooled to form a team knowledge stock.  With this new understanding, the team can produce a 
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team decision that is of higher quality than they would have if they did not have the pooled 
information (Gigone & Hastie, 1993).   Consequently, sharing information among team members 
is a critical process in making quality decisions.  Moreover, sharing the needed information to 
the right team member influences whether or not the most effective decision is chosen by the 
team.  The following section will discuss how the exchange of information within a team can 
influence decision making and performance.  Within this review, hypotheses regarding 
information sharing content will be presented. 
Information Sharing 
Information Sharing and Team Performance  
As previously stated, teams differ from groups because of their need to work 
interdependently.  “Although they assign roles, differentiate responsibilities, and hire members 
with complementary skills, the purpose of teams is to coordinate work toward a common goal” 
(Hinds & Weisband, 2003, p. 21).  A plethora of research has been dedicated to understanding 
how to improve team performance (see Gist, Locke, & Taylor, 1987; Mathieu, Heffner, 
Goodwin, Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; Salas, Dickinson, Converse, & Tannenbaum, 1992).  
The commonality among the studies is that for team members to efficiently and effectively 
coordinate their efforts, they need to develop a shared understanding of both the goal and what is 
needed to accomplish it (Hinds & Weisband, 2003).   The initial stage in developing this shared 
understanding is not possible without much explicit information sharing.  Generally, decision 
making teams are faced with a set of choices (e.g., to fire or not to fire at the aircraft).  When 
possible, the team members formally convene to discuss the alternatives and determine the final 
decision.  Each member usually comes to the discussion with pre-existing information about the 
decision choices available.  Then, the team members share their input and come to a consensus 
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on the decision.  “In principle, pooling information permits a group decision that is more 
informed than the decisions of members acting individually” (Stasser & Titus, 1985, p. 1467).  
That is, individually, people may have incomplete information—whether biased or partial, but 
combining all of the team members’ information together, they can prevent errors.  However, 
Stasser and Titus proposed a biased sampling model of group discussion that suggests that 
“group members often fail to effectively pool their information because discussion tends to be 
dominated by (a) information that members hold in common before discussion and (b) 
information that supports members’ existent preferences” (Stasser & Titus, 1985, p. 1467). This 
group polarization effect is exaggerated when team members are performing under stressful 
conditions and have to make life-or-death decisions while faced with severe time pressures—
conditions often faced by military members.  Consequently, the results of the discussion usually 
focus on the biases that team members hold instead of correcting their biases with other 
information that are provided to the team members.  Moreover, pre-discussion information will 
shape the preference of one decision choice because of the increased discussion of biased 
information—leading to either an effective or ineffective decision.  This informational bias has 
underscored the need to further understand how this phenomenon influences effective decision 
making and team performance.  Stasser and Titus’ (1985) study on pooling partial and biased 
information has laid the foundation for contemporary research on information sharing in teams. 
Stasser and Titus (1985) proposed two extreme distributions: (a) shared information—
data familiar to all group members, and (b) unshared information—data only held by one 
member.  Some researchers refer to these distributions as common or unique information 
(Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009; Hinzs, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). The commonality-
uniqueness dimension may resemble research derived from the social psychology research 
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domain referred to as group polarization (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977).  Stasser and Titus’ 
information sampling model posits that the degree of shared pre-discussion information that the 
team members hold will have an influence on the decision choice selected.  Empirical research 
has shown that team discussions consists more of shared information rather than unshared 
information (Cramton & Orvis, 2003; Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009; Stasser & Titus, 
1985).  Additionally, discussions are swayed by the present preferences of the team, that is, 
dissenting information is less likely to emerge in discussions (Stasser & Titus, 1987). 
Stasser and Titus’ (1985) experiment investigated the effect of information sharedness on 
decision making.  Specifically, they designed profiles of political candidates who were 
campaigning for student body president.  Each candidate’s profile contained 16 items of 
information that differed in proportions of positive, neutral, and negative items (e.g., 
biographical data, academic policies, student social life, etc).  The profile for Candidate A had 
eight positive, four neutral, and four negative items.  The authors also included two candidates 
(Candidates B and C) who had four positive, eight neutral, and four negative items.  Essentially, 
Candidate A was the most favorable candidate.  To examine if Candidate A would be selected, 
the authors implemented three experimental conditions—(a) shared condition: all the information 
about each candidate was shared amongst all team participants; (b) unshared/consensus: only 
eight items were shared and the information presented to each team member was biased against 
Candidate A and in favor of Candidate B; (c) unshared/conflict: only eight items were shared and 
half of the team members received information in favor of Candidate B over Candidate C, 
whereas the other team members were provided with information in favor of Candidate C over 
Candidate B.   
 
14 
Although the information in the unshared groups was biased toward either Candidates B 
or C, the total pooled information still was in favor of Candidate A, a concept that is referred to 
as hidden profiles.  The participants were given these descriptions and instructed to convene in a 
political caucus to determine the best candidate.  The results were that the participants’ 
preferences before the group discussion were consistent with the biased sampling conditions and 
exacerbated in the post-group discussion attitudes.  Thus, group discussion simply perpetuated 
initial opinions rather than correcting them.  The authors also found that Candidate A was most 
often chosen in the shared condition than the unshared and Candidate B was chosen more often 
in the unshared conditions than in the shared conditions.  Further, Candidate C was more often 
chosen in unshared/conflict condition than the unshared/consensus condition. This seminal study 
on sharedness of information and decision making supports that more accurate decisions are 
made when more data are shared among team members.  
More recently, Henningsen and Henningsen (2007) examined Stasser and Titus’ 
information bias and included the concept of a masked profile.  In contrast to hidden profiles, 
masked profiles are when the group members receive identical information about the candidate.  
However, the identical information does not include the full data to make the preferential 
decision.  The authors provided the following example to compare hidden profiles to masked 
profiles. Take a decision set of nine decision criteria, with six in favor of Option A (e.g., Items 
a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6) and three in favor of Option B (e.g., Items b1, b2, b3).  For individuals with 
full information, each team member would be provided with all nine decision items. For 
individuals in a hidden profile, they would collectively have all of the information.  
Hypothetically, Person X would have decision items a1 and a2, along with b1, b2, and b3.  Person 
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Y would have decision items a3 and a4, along with b1, b2, and b3. Person Z would have decision 
items a5 and a6, along with b1, b2, and b3.  
To contrast, for masked profiles, all team members would receive identical information, 
but the data provided would resemble a hidden profile.  For example, all individuals would 
receive decision items a1 and a2, along with b1, b2, and b3. Therefore, the data support Option B, 
even though Option A is the optimal alternative.  Moreover, all members in the group do not 
have the information to make a decision that would go against the initial decision preference bias 
of Option B (Henningsen & Henningsen, 2007). When comparing full information groups (i.e., 
groups with shared information) to masked and hidden profile groups, the authors hypothesized 
that the full information groups should prefer the optimal decision choice.  Using a similar 
experimental design as Stasser and Titus (1985), they found that the full information groups 
preferred the optimal decision over the suboptimal choice before convening with the group.  As 
hypothesized, the opposite trend was found for both the hidden and masked profiles.  The full 
information groups selected the optimal candidate over the inferior, whereas the hidden profile 
and masked profile groups chose the inferior candidate more often.   Moreover, in the hidden 
profile group, no group selected the best candidate.  The results of this study not only underscore 
the importance of information sharing in team decision making quality, but support that the 
fewer the number of people share information, the more likely decision errors will be committed.   
To further understand the information sharing-team performance relation, I lean on the 
results from Mesmer-Magnus and Dechurch’s (2009) meta-analysis of 72 independent studies.  
The results supported that information sharing positively predicted team outcomes—team 
performance, cohesion, member satisfaction, and knowledge integration. Overall, these results, 
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along with aforementioned studies, support that information sharing is important for team 
decision making and performance.  Thus, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Information sharing is expected to positively predict team performance. 
 
Although there is are many studies supporting the frequency of information sharing 
among teams—that is, the more information sharing that occurs among the team, the more that 
the team excels—there is less support in understanding the intricacies of the information sharing 
that makes it so influential on team performance.  It is also important to note that as the team 
becomes more familiar with the members and task, they engage in more sophisticated, implicit 
coordination (Blickensderfer, Reynolds, Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2010).  However, for this 
study, the focus is on the introductory stages of ad-hoc virtual teams, and in turn, explicit 
information sharing.  Therefore, it is in my interest to empirically understand what type of 
information exchange is prominent for selecting a successful decision.  To do so, I will examine 
content of information sharing among members and hypothesize how it is expected to relate to 
team performance.  As the team members in this study communicated via computer, in the 
following section, I will provide an overview of the literature concerning the content of 
information sharing among virtual team members and how it has been referenced to impact team 
performance.  
Information Sharing Content in Virtual Teams 
The majority of team research has been conducted among team members who interact 
face-to-face in Western societies.  However, with globalization in the forefront, more and more 
individuals are working virtually with team members across the world.  As a result of ignoring 
time zones, language barriers, and traditional five day work-week, previously established team 
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dynamics are changing rapidly to accommodate these new role expectations.  In response, there 
is an emerging literature sub-domain examining global virtual teams. 
Virtual teams heavily depend on information technology—email, phone calls, 
voicemail—for knowledge sharing.  When team members depend on electronic mediums, 
information can get lost in translation causing delays in critical problem solving, disagreements, 
and frustration (Hinds & Weisband, 2003). Further, cultivating a shared mental model becomes a 
challenge for virtual teams (Hinds & Weisband, 2003). Thus, effective information sharing is 
even more necessary for goal accomplishment in virtual teams.  Many teams within the military 
now require members to interact across time zones for mission success.  Thus, additional 
research on how virtual teams interact is necessary to help the Warfighter.  Because members of 
virtual teams cannot rely on the nonverbal communication (e.g., body language) that 
overwhelming represents most of communication and how individuals derive meaning through 
the interaction, it is a key objective within this study to understand what information sharing 
content is most influential to team performance.  In the current study, the participants are 
restricted to a virtual environment, thus they are limited to using only text-like communication 
and email.  The results of this experiment can then lead to a better understanding of information 
sharing within virtual teams as they differ greatly from face-to-face teams.   
Cramton and Orvis (2003) denoted that there were three content areas of information 
sharing that are relevant to virtual teams—task, social, and contextual information.  Task 
information refers to information about the processes needed to perform the objective (e.g., how 
to use a tool, what resources are available, when products or reports are due, alternative 
approaches to performing the task, the status of the work).  Social information is communication 
about individuals and their relationships with each other (e.g., personal motives and goals, 
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personality traits, where individuals grew up and were educated, their philosophical outlook).  
Team members use social information to help them interpret the behavior of others.  Finally, 
contextual information is sharing information about the milieu or environment that surrounds 
tasks, individuals, and groups.  It is hypothesized that the abovementioned content areas are 
important for team performance because they address both the task- and social-related aspects of 
team performance.  However, capturing these content areas may not be possible when the virtual 
teams are ad-hoc and together for a short period of time.  For example, a Marine who is directed 
to work with a team to manage the transport of a day-long convoy may not have too much 
opportunity to engage in the social-related information sharing.  Instead, it is plausible that the 
majority of the communication with his/her team may be solely focused on task-related 
information sharing.   
Serfaty et al developed an information-sharing content framework that can be adopted for 
ad-hoc virtual teams developed for a short-term task.  Their framework was three-dimensional, 
including general information (e.g., time of accident), action and task (e.g., telling a teammate to 
correct an error), and problem-solving and planning (e.g., reviewing the strategy to rescue 
hostages).  Like Serfaty et al.’s framework, Rosen’s (2010) content coding does not include the 
social-related communication that is less likely to occur in ad-hoc virtual teams; however, it goes 
beyond three content areas.  This more recent coding system was adapted by leveraging from 
past systems in the literature, specifically, Poole and Roth’s (1989) Decision Functions Coding 
System.  The Decision Functions Coding System (DFCS) was a combination of two others:  
Bales’ (1950) Interaction Process Analysis system and Fisher’s (1970) Decision Proposal coding 




Table 1. Poole's (1989) Decision Functions Coding System 
 
To accommodate his data, Rosen (2010) added two additional coding dimensions to his 
adapted system: Team Information Exchange and Team Knowledge Sharing.  Rosen’s final 
coding system is referenced in Table 2.  To summarize, Rosen (2010) reported that the only 
simple linear relation found between a coding dimension and team performance was supported 
by Team Knowledge Sharing—suggesting that teammates who engaged in more knowledge 
sharing performed better. A finding, contradicting what is typically reported in literature (e.g., 
Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009), was a significant negative relation between Team 
Information Exchange and team performance, when Simple Agreement was statistically 
controlled.  This finding maybe due to the coding definition of Team Information Exchange not 
including Acknowledgments, in that the data would suggest that higher-performing teams have a 
stronger relation between information exchange and acknowledgements than their lower-
performing counterparts. Moreover, if information exchange occurred without 
 Communication Code Description 
Problem Activity 
Problem Analysis Statements that define or analyze the problem 
Problem Critique Statements that support or criticize problem analysis 
Executive Activity 
Orientation 
Statements that direct the group's process or help the 
group to do its work 
Process Reflection Solutions or proposals 
Solution Activity 
Solution Analysis 
Review of issues to date, review of the design or 
schedule, restatement of issues, alternatives, criteria 
Solution Design Statements that propose solutions 
Solution Elaboration Statements that alter or amend solutions 
Solution Evaluation 
Statements that support (+), criticize (-), or offer 
evaluation (/) of solutions. 
Solution Confirmation Votes or offer final confirmation of decisions 
Other Disorganized or non-focused discussion. 
Tangents  Moving to an unrelated subject 
Simple Agreement  Statements that express agreement 
Simple Disagreement  Statements that express disagreement 
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acknowledgement, this information sharing connection would weaken its association with team 
performance. However, upon further examination, when the ratio of Team Information Exchange 
to Team Knowledge Sharing was analyzed, he reported a significant negative relation—teams 
that shared less information in proportion to knowledge sharing performed better.  Other findings 
from this include a positive relation between Simple Agreement and team performance and an 
inverted-U curvilinear relation between Team Process and Plan Regulation and team 
performance.   
Table 2. Rosen's (2010) Coding System 
  
Process Code Brief Description 
Team Information 
Exchange:  Sharing 




Utterances containing facts about the task environment or 
situation—simple information that can be accessed from 
one source in the displays and ‘one bit’ statements. 
Information 
Request 
Question utterances asking for a response of simple 
information about the task environment or situation, or 
questions asking for repetition of immediately preceding 
information. 







Statements about the task environment or situation that 
provide either 1) an integration of more than one pieces of 
simple information, or 2) an evaluation or interpretation of 
the meaning, value, or significance of information within 
the current operation. 
Knowledge 
Request 
Question utterances that request a complex information 
response about the task environment or situation: to answer 
the question, the response should provide either 1) an 
integration of more than one piece of simple information, 
or 2) an evaluation or interpretation of the meaning, value, 
or significance of information within the current operation. 
Team Solution Option 
Generation:  Offering 





Statements that provide an incomplete solution—a 
sequence of actions (i.e., moving resources) intended to 
meet a given operation objective—or ask for further 
refinement and clarification of a solution. This includes 




Statements explicitly proposing a complete or near 
complete solution— a sequence of actions intended to meet 
a given operation objective. A complete solution includes 
locations, resources, and vehicles except for solutions 




Although there is much strength to the Rosen (2010) study, the research is still unclear on 
which information sharing content is most influential for team performance, providing the slight 
inconsistencies in research.  Thus, the following exploratory research question is proposed: 
Research question:  Which information sharing content area(s) relate to team 
performance?  
Process Code Brief Description 
Team Evaluation and 
Negotiation of 
Alternatives:  Clarifying 
and discussing positive 
and negative consequences 
of 
potential solution options 
Solution 
Evaluation 
Utterances that 1) compare different potential solutions on 
the basis of speed, cost, or ease of execution, 2) provide 
support or criticism of a single potential solution, or 3) ask 
for an evaluation of a potential solution. 
Team Process and Plan 
Regulation:  Critiquing the 
team’s process 
Goal / Task 
Orientation 
Utterances directing the team’s process or helping it do its 
work by proposing questioning, or commenting on goals 
for the team or specific actions team member’s need to take 
to address a goal. These statements direct what the team 
should do next or later in the future. This includes self-




Statement’s that provide or ask about what the team is 
currently doing or what is currently happening with the 
simulation. 
Reflection 
Utterances that provide or ask for a critique or evaluation of 







Simple agreement/disagreement utterances are expressions 
of agreement or disagreement with no rationale provided. 
Acknowledgements are utterances providing recognition of 




Incomplete utterances are statements that have no explicit 
meaning because they are missing one or more critical 
components of grammar: subjects, verbs, or objects.  
Fillers are sounds or words that are spoken to fill gaps 
between utterances. 
An exclamation is an utterance that has no grammatical 
connection to surrounding utterances and emphatically 
expresses emotion.  
Tangent / 
Off-task 
Non-task related statements including jokes, sarcastic 
comments, comments on the nature of the experiment, and 
statements that have nothing to do with the task at hand. 
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty statements explicitly express either general or 
specific uncertainty about the roles, tasks, situations, or 




Further, the literature has not addressed whether and how cultural context may shift or 
change the relations altogether.  More specifically, do the data support that cultural values 
moderate the relation between information sharing and team performance?  Thus, in this study, I 
will examine how culture may relate to information sharing and team performance.  In turn, a 
review of literature on culture follows. 
 
Culture 
As in civilian corporations, NATO operations often involve international collaboration 
and intercultural interactions with allied countries.  This is the current reality for American 
corporations as well, due to the dependence on international employees, customers, suppliers, 
and competitors (Javidan, Dorfman, de Luque, & House, 2006).  To expand how the globalized 
market has been affected, “foreign sales by multinational corporations have exceeded $7 trillion 
and are growing 20 percent to 30 percent faster than their sales of exports” (Javidan et al., 2006, 
p. 67).  Although the need to operate in multicultural environment to remain competitive mirrors 
that of the military, the consequences of not understanding the culture of other nations for 
servicepersons operating abroad, and in multicultural teams, are often more critical, and 
sometimes, life-threatening. Thus, there is a need to research how national cultural differences 
influence organizational and team processes and outcomes.   
It has been noted by many researchers that “culture affects our knowledge structures, 
beliefs, and how we understand the world around us, make attributions, behave, communicate, 
etc.” (12-1, Bjornstad; Hewstone, 1989; Hofstede, 1991; Hofstede, 2001; Javidan, et al., 2006; 
Miller, 1984; Smith & Bond, 1993; Triandis, 1976; Triandis, Vassiliou, Vassiliou, Tanaka, & 
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Shanmugan, 1972). It is a “unique meaning and information system, shared by a group, and 
communicated from one generation to the next” (Matsumoto, 2009, p. 12; Matsumoto & Juang, 
2007). Moreover, cultural differences can affect the overall military mission success at both the 
commanding and platoon levels.  Working at both levels requires seamless interactions and 
negotiations with the local population, authorities, law enforcement, and military personnel.  
Failure to gain the trust of the people can result in compromised intelligence information, 
increased insecurity, unwarranted danger, and overall mission jeopardy (Van Meer, Veldhuis, & 
Schwerzel, 2008).  Knowledge and fluency in the host country culture is necessary to win the 
hearts and minds of the people and to facilitate partnerships, cooperation, and coalitions (Van 
Meer, Veldhuis, & Schwerzel, 2008).  Furthermore, a concrete awareness of culture should be 
engaged by both military and non-military teams that are involved in multinational operations. 
Defining Culture 
One challenge in culture research is discriminating between cultures.  The root of the 
struggle has been identified as the definition of culture – it has continuously changed over time 
and across disciplines (i.e., psychology, anthropology, and sociology domains).  Most people 
have an idea of what ‘culture’ is, with connotations ranging from literature, education, and the 
arts to what anthropologists refer to patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting (Smith, 2008; 
Hofstede, 1991).  Hofstede refers to the former as ‘culture one’—“culture in the narrow sense” 
and the latter as ‘culture two’ (Hofstede, 1991, p. 5).  The focus of this study will be exploring 
‘culture two’.   
Arriving at a single definition of culture becomes even more difficult because there are 
many forms of culture—such as ethnicity, nationality, religion, region, language, geographical 
area, ecology, age, hobbies, lifestyles, strength of kinship bonds, social class, and corporate 
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culture (Cohen, 2009; Smith, 2008; Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998).  Thus, the culture 
definition used varies from study to study.  Consequently, readers interested in influences of 
“culture” on various outcomes can be easily misled. 
Many definitions of culture have been offered, all developed from the Latin derivation 
referring to the “tilling of the soil” (p.4, Hofstede, 1991).  Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) 
gathered 164 definitions of culture (please see Table 1 for an abridged list of culture definitions).  
After more than five decades since the Kroeber and Kluckhohn compilation, more definitions 
have been offered. The most referenced authors in the cross-cultural domain are Hofstede, 
Kluckhohn, and Triandis, with each researcher providing their own perspective on culture.  
Hofstede (1991) defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes 
the members of one group or category of people from another” (p. 5).  Kluckhohn’s (1951) 
definition was that “culture consists in patterns of thinking, feeling, and reacting…” (p.86). 
Triandis (2004) specified that culture develops in adaptive interactions, it includes 
commonalties, and it is shared through time and generations. Hofstede’s definition focuses on 
the cognitive facets, whereas Kluckhohn includes cognitive, affective, and behavioral aspects of 
culture in his definition. Triandis concentrates on the ascribed function of culture—that it is 
learned and shared over time. In total, culture is a “(a) collective, not individual attribute, (b) not 
directly visible but manifested in behaviors, and (c) common to some but not all people” 




Table 3. Definitions of Culture 
 
 
Each of the aforementioned definitions still oversimplifies the sophistication that this 
construct denotes.  To capture the complexity, researchers have identified dimensions of culture 
to refine and test the construct.  In the following section, I will provide an overview of the 
cultural frameworks most often cited in the literature. 
Cultural Frameworks 
It has been documented that people from different cultures behave differently.  
Researchers have dedicated effort to diagnosing the important variables that leads to behavioral 
differences.  In doing so, they have developed various cultural frameworks; detailing aspects of 
Sources Definition 
Fiske (2002, p.85) 
A culture is a socially constructed constellation consisting of such things 
as practices, competencies, ideas, schemas, symbols, values, norms, 
institutions, goals, constitutive rules, artifacts, and modifications of the 
physical environment. 
Boyd & Richerson (1985, p. 
33) 
Culture is information capable of affecting individuals’ phenotypes 
which they acquire from other conspecifics by teaching or imitation. 
Lumsden (1989, p.15) 
A system of socially learnable knowledge shared among members of a 
society. 
Smith & Bonds (1999, p. 39) A culture is a relatively organized system of shared meanings. 
Hofstede (2001, p. 1) 
 “The collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
members of one group or category of people from another” 
Kluckhohn  
Culture consists in patterns of thinking, feeling and reacting, [..]; the 
essential core of culture consists of traditional [..] ideas and especially 
their attached values”. 
Matsumoto (Hughes et al., 
2009) 
“A unique meaning and information system, shared by a group, and 
communicated from one generation to the next”. 
Shiraev and Levy (2007) 
Culture is “a set of attitudes, behaviors, and symbols shared by a large 
group of people and usually communicated from one generation to the 
next” (p. 4).   
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culture that have been theorized to have relations with behavior (please see Table 4 for a list of 
different cultural frameworks).  Within the past five years, there have been at least 45 cultural 
dimensions identified in the literature; however, providing details about each dimension is 
beyond the scope of this study (please see Salas, Burke, Wilson-Donnelly, & Fowlkes, 2004 for 
an overview).  The most widely accepted dimensions of culture were those developed by 
Hofstede (1980), but many frameworks have followed, some of which will be discussed further, 
namely those from Trompenaar, Schwartz, the GLOBE project, and the Cultural Mosaic. 
Hofstede’s Cultural Values 
Arguably, the most researched cultural dimensions are Hofstede’s five cultural 
dimensions— Power Distance, Individualism / Collectivism, Masculinity / Femininity, 
Uncertainty Avoidance, and Long-Term / Short-Term Orientation.  This seminal research that 
spearheaded the original four dimensions (excluding Long-Term / Short-Term Orientation, 
which was added in the late 1980s) was conducted by Geert Hofstede by analyzing data from 
IBM employees from 40 countries (Hofstede 1984; Hofstede & McCrae, 2004).  Power Distance 
is the degree to which unequal power distribution in a society is tolerated (Hofstede, 2006; 
Spector, Cooper, & Sparks, 2001).  Specifically, it is the extent to which the less powerful 
members of society accept and expect that there is an unequal distribution of power (Hofstede, 
1980; 1991).  The Individualism / Collectivism dimension is the most researched cultural 
dimension from Hofstede’s framework, focusing on the extent to which individuals are 
integrated into groups.  In more individualistic societies, there is more importance placed on 
protecting the self and immediate family.  In contrast, collectivist cultures emphasize being a part 
of a cohesive group and looking after members of an extended family “in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004, p. 63; Hofstede, 1980; 1991).   Masculinity / 
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Femininity is a continuum indicating the distribution of gender roles, with the assertive pole 
named “masculine” and the modest, caring pole named “feminine” (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004).  
Moreover, it is the extent to which stereotypical masculine objectives of wealth, assertiveness, 
competitiveness, and recognition are esteemed instead of focusing on modesty and caring for 
others (Hofstede, 1980; 1991; Paulus, Bichelmeyer, Malopinsky, Pereira, & Rastogi, 2005). 
Uncertainty Avoidance refers to the tolerance for risk and ambiguity (Hofstede & McCrae; 
Paulus, et al., 2005).  Cultures that score high in uncertainty avoidance attempt to minimize 
ambiguous situations by implementing strict laws and safety/security precautions.  Individuals 
living in uncertain avoiding cultures are often more expressive and anxious and tend to be 
viewed as more “busy, fidgety, emotional, aggressive, active” (Hofstede, 1991, p. 115).   Long-
Term / Short-Term focuses on “fostering virtues that are oriented toward future rewards versus 
emphasis on immediate gratification” (Paulus, Bichelmeyer, Malopinsky, Pereira, & Rastogi, 
2005, p. 44). Long-Term Orientation suggests an inclination for planning whereas short-term 
orientation indicates a tendency for action (Lichacz, 2008).   
Trompenaar’s Waves of Culture 
Hofstede’s study sparked additional cross-cultural studies examining differences in 
behavior. Trompenaars conducted research on over 30,000 managers representing 30 
multinational corporations from 55 countries.  His work resulted in a similar taxonomy of values 
that was proposed by Hofstede, however, he provides additional insight on a couple of 
dimensions (i.e., dividing power distance into status that is warranted by achievement or by 
inherited by birth).  Trompenaars’ cultural framework has seven dimensions, each posing their 
own dilemma—Universalism – Particularism (what is more important – rules or relationships?), 
Individualism – Communitarinism (do we function in a group or as an individual?), Specific – 
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Diffuse cultures (how far do we get involved?), Affective – Neutral cultures (do we display our 
emotions?), Achievement – Ascription (do we have to prove ourselves to receive status or is it 
given to us?), Sequential – Synchronic (do we do things one at a time or several things at once?), 
and Internal – External Control (do we control our environment  or work with it?).  Due to the 
overlap with Hofstede’s Big Five (e.g., Trompenaars’ Communitarism and Hofstede’s 
Collectivism), Trompenaars’ framework allows for more feasible conceptual integration (Carr, 
2004) with Hofstede’s empirically-supported framework, reinforcing the maintenance of 
Hofstede’s dimensions in cultural research.  
Schwartz Value Survey 
Most of the cross-cultural research has used business managers and personnel for their 
sample to help generate their dimensions.  However, Schwartz (Thompson & Gooler, 1996) 
provided a paradigm shift from the conventional method.  He investigated value preferences of 
secondary school teachers and students from 64 nations (www. imo-
international.de/index_englisch.htm?/englisch/html/svs_info_en.htm). His rationale for using this 
sample instead of managers was that the classroom is a central location where cultural values are 
passed on.  The results of the Schwartz Value Survey yielded ten individual-level motivational 
values and goals and seven cultural orientations.  The ten cultural orientations include 
conservatism, intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy, hierarchy, egalitarianism, mastery, and 
harmony.  Details about these cultural orientations are featured in Table 4.  Again, Schwartz’ 




The GLOBE Project 
Similar to previous cross-cultural studies, the researchers for the Global Leadership and 
Organizational Behavior Effectiveness project examined approximately 20,000 managers in over 
60 countries, ranging from Albania to Zimbabwe (Javidan & House, 2001; Grove, 2005).  The 
results from the project yielded nine ecological factors that are related to leadership behavior. 
The factors are Performance Orientation, Assertiveness, Future Orientation, Human Orientation, 
Institutional Collectivism, In-group Collectivism, Gender Egalitarianism, Power Distance, and 
Uncertainty Avoidance (see Table 4 for more details on each dimension). Some of these 
dimensions echo those from Hofstede’s Big Five (e.g., power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance); however, integration of study results should be cautioned as the criterion for the 
GLOBE project was leadership behavior instead of general work behavior.  Nonetheless, the 
overlap in dimensions supports consistency in the research across different methodologies, 
nations, and criteria.   
The Cultural Mosaic 
The most comprehensive framework of culture is Chao and Moon’s (2005) Cultural 
Mosaic. In essence, they describe a person’s or a nation’s culture as being comprised of multiple 
tiles—demographic, geographic, and associative characteristics (more details are found in Table 
3).  Although the Cultural Mosaic encompasses a multidimensional approach to the culture 




Table 4. Cultural Frameworks 
Source Framework 
Hofstede (1980) – 
Cultural Values 
 Power distance: the prevailing norms of inequality within a culture.  
 Individualism – Collectivism: the extent to which the identity of members of a given culture is shaped 
primarily by personal choices and achievements of by the groups to which they belong. 
 Masculinity – Femininity: in masculine cultures, values such as “competition, success, and performance are 
relatively more prevalent than in feminine cultures, where there is relatively more emphasis on values such as 
warm social relationships, quality of life, and care of the weak. 
 Uncertainty Avoidance: the degree to which members of a culture are uncomfortable with uncertainties in life.  
 Long-term orientation – Short-term orientation: fostering virtues that are oriented toward future rewards 




 Universalism versus Particularism – “people from universalistic cultures focus more on rules, are more 
precise when defining contracts and tend to define global standards for company policies and human resources 
practices. Within more particularistic national cultures, the focus is more on the relationships; contracts can be 
adapted to satisfy new requirements in specific situations and local variations of company and human 
resources policies are created to adapt to different requirements.” 
 Individualism and Communitarinism – “this dimension classifies countries according to the balance between 
individual and group interests.  Generally, team members with individualist mindsets see the improvements to 
their groups as the means to achieve their own objectives. By contrast, the team members from communitarian 
cultures see the improvements to individual capacities as a step towards the group prosperity”. 
 Specific versus Diffuse Cultures – “Specific cultures exhibit more ‘directness’, whereas diffuse cultures are 
more indirect and have blurred boundaries (e.g., work and leisure).” 
 Achievement versus Ascription – “people from achievement-oriented countries respect their colleagues based 
on previous achievements and the demonstration of knowledge, and show their job titles only when relevant. 
On the other hand, people from ascription-oriented cultures use their titles extensively and usually respect 
their superiors in hierarchy.” 
 Neutral versus Affective – “In affective cultures, the expression of emotion by individuals is taken as more 
natural and indeed admired by others in these cultures.  On the other hand, in neutral cultures, the expression 








Orientations and Value 
Types 
 
 Conservatism: the person is viewed as embedded in a collectivity, finding meaning in life largely through 
social relationships and identifying with the group. A cultural emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, 
propriety, and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidarity group or the traditional order. 
(Social order, respect for tradition, family security, wisdom). 
 Intellectual Autonomy:  the person is an autonomous, bounded entity and finds meaning in his / her own 
uniqueness, seeking to express own internal attributes (preferences, traits, feelings) and is encouraged to do so. 
Intellectual Autonomy has a cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing their 
own ideas and intellectual directions (curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity). 
 Affective Autonomy: the person is an autonomous, bounded entity and finds meaning in his/her own 
uniqueness, seeking to express own internal attributes (preferences, traits, feelings) and is encouraged to do so.  
Affective Autonomy promotes and protects the individual’s independent pursuit of own affectively positive 
experience (pleasure, exciting life, varied life). 
 Hierarchy: a hierarchical, differential allocation of fixed roles of resources is the legitimate, desirable way to 
regulate interdependencies. People are socialized to comply with the obligations and rules sanctioned if they 
do not. A cultural emphasis on the legitimacy of an unequal distribution of power, roles and resources (social 
power, authority, humility, wealth). 
 Egalitarianism: individuals are portrayed as moral equals, who share basic interests and who are socialized to 
transcend selfish interests, cooperate involuntarily with others, and show concern for everyone’s welfare 
(equality, social justice, freedom, responsibility, honesty). People are socialized to as autonomous rather than 
interdependent because autonomous person have no natural commitment to others (equality, social justice, 
freedom, responsibility, honesty). 
 Mastery: groups and individuals should master, control, and change the social and natural environment 
through assertive action in order to further personal or group interest. A cultural emphasis on getting ahead 
through active self-assertion (ambition, success, daring, competence). 
 Harmony: the world is accepted as it is.  Groups and individuals should fit harmoniously into the natural and 
social world, avoiding change and self-assertion to modify them (unity with nature, protecting the 





Chao & Moon (2005) 
– Cultural Mosaic 
 Demographic tiles of the cultural mosaic – inherited physical characteristics and social identities (e.g., age, 
ethnicity, gender, race) 
 Geographic tiles of the cultural mosaic – physical characteristics of the land (natural or man-made) that can 
influence group identities (e.g., climate, temperature, coastal/inland, urban/rural, regional/country) 
 Associative tiles of the cultural mosaic – all groups (informal and formal) with whom the person identifies 
(e.g., family, religion, employer, profession, politics, avocations). 
Six Dimensions of 
National Culture - 
(Sutton & Gundling, 
2005) 
 
 Independence / Interdependence: Shapes a preference for individual initiative and action, or for a more 
group-oriented approach emphasizes the interests of the team as a whole  
 Egalitarianism /  Status: Shapes a preference for mutual consultation in decision-making, or for greater 
deference to rank and hierarchy 
 Risk / Restraint: Shapes a preference for rapid action and risk-taking, or for more cautious and calculated 
actions based on ample information 
 Direct / Indirect: Shapes a preference for open and explicit communication, or for careful attention paid to 
context or to implicit meanings in a given message 
 Task / Relationship: Shapes a preference for immediate attention to getting the job done, or for establishing 
strong and trusting personal relationships first 
 Short-term / Long-term: Shapes a preference for making choices based upon a narrow time horizon, or for 
considering the impact that choices will have over a longer span of time 
World Values 
Survey 
 Traditional / Secular-Rational: “…[this] dimension reflects the contrast between societies in which religion is 
very important and those in which it is not… Societies near the traditional pole emphasize the importance of 
parent-child ties and deference to authority, along with absolute standards and traditional family values, and 
reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. These societies have high levels of national pride, and a 
nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these 
topics” (www.worldvaluessurvey.com).  
 Survival / Self-Expression: “The unprecedented wealth that has accumulated in advanced societies during the 
past generation means that an increasing share of the population has grown up taking survival for granted. 
Thus, priorities have shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an 













 Performance Orientation: “the degree to which a collective encourages and rewards (and should encourage 
and reward) group members for performance improvement and excellence.” 
 Assertiveness: “the degree to which individuals are (and should be) assertive, confrontational, and aggressive 
in their relationships with others.” 
 Future Orientation: “the extent to which individuals engages (and should engage) in future-oriented behaviors 
such as delaying gratification, planning, and investing in the future.” 
 Human Orientation: “the degree to which a collective encourages and rewards (and should encourage and 
reward) individuals for being fair, altruistic, generous, caring, and kind to others.” 
 Institutional Collectivism: “the degree to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage 
and reward (and should encourage and reward) collective distribution of resources and collective action. 
 In-group Collectivism: “the degree to which individuals express (and should express) pride, loyalty, and 
cohesiveness in their organizations or families.” 
 Gender Egalitarianism: “the degree to which a collective minimizes (and should minimize) gender inequality. 
 Power Distance: “the degree to which members of a collective expect (and should expect) power to be 
distributed equally.” 
 Uncertainty Avoidance: “the extent to which a society, organization, or group relies (and should rely) on 







 Time Horizon: “…describes how far ahead people set goals and look to justify their actions” (Klein, 2004, p. 
12). 
 Achievement vs. Relationship: “For achievement groups, work related activities are a central focus and 
accomplishment a defining goal” (Klein, 2004, p. 15). “In relationship groups, cultures, interpersonal 
dynamics, and nurturing relationships are central focus” (Klein, 2004, p. 15). 
 Mastery vs. Fatalism: “A mastery orientation is based on the belief that people are dominant over nature and 
can control their environment” (Klein, 2004, p. 13).  “Those who hold a fatalistic orientation respect the 
external factors that control their lives” (Klein, 2004, p. 13).  
 Tolerance for Uncertainty:  “…describes how people function in the face of uncertainty” (Klein, 2004, p. 
17).  
 Power Distance: “…describes the extent to which all members in a group expect and accept that power will be 
distributed unevenly” (Klein, 2004, p. 16). 
 Hypothetical vs. Concrete Reasoning:  “Hypothetical thinkers use mental representations of future events to 
consider alternate outcomes” (Klein, 2004, p. 18).  “People who engage in concrete reasoning respect the 
constraints imposed by context and carefully integrate those constraints into their thinking” (Klein, 2004, p., 
18).  
 Attribution: “…focuses attention and narrows the selection criteria for approaches or remedies” (Klein, 2004, 
p. 19)  
 Differentiation vs. Dialectical Reasoning: “Differentiation reasoners work to understand contradictions by 
separating, analyzing, and evaluating distinct qualities” (Klein, 2004, p. 20).  “Dialectical reasoners evaluate 






Cultural Framework for this Study 
There have been many cultural frameworks proposed (see Table 4) in the literature over 
the years; however, Hofstede’s five domains have been the most widely used by researchers, but 
it is not without criticism.  First, the dimensions were developed based on data from employees 
within one organization—IBM.  Even though there were participants from various countries, the 
employees worked in a U. S. multinational organization.  “Individuals who work for an 
American multinational are likely to have been carefully chosen for their ability to adapt to 
American policies/procedures, and undoubtedly work in an environment that is somewhat 
different from that in locally owned companies” (Spector, Cooper, & Sparks, 2001, p. 280).  So, 
the data may reflect the culture variation within one [American] organization (hence, controlling 
for organizational differences) and may be different if the employees were representing local 
organizations.  Second, the data from the Hofstede study were collected almost 30 years ago 
(Smith, 1992); it is plausible that cultural values have shifted over time.  Nations change over 
time and due to access and exposure to new ideas and knowledge (Klein, 2004).  This may have 
implications for the construct validity of the dimensions, as there has been less agreement with 
the original results from later studies (Spector, Cooper, & Sparks, 2001).  Another concern 
related to the original study is that Hofstede reported the means for the countries—undermining 
the variation within each country (Smith, 1992).  Also, there may be more between-nation 
variation that may have been missed because they were not featured in Hofstede’s questionnaire.  
The final critique is that there are gender differences observed for the MF scale, leading to 




Although the criticisms cannot be ignored, Hofstede’s VSM-94 provides many 
contributions that have proliferated cultural research. “Hofstede’s concepts continue to provide 
the best available basis for thinking about cross-national differences in many aspects of 
organizational performance” (Smith, 1992, p. 41).  For the past three decades, the Hofstede 
dimensions have been the most featured and researched cultural framework for countless studies 
and across career fields.  To date, it is the only known culture operationalization that has been 
validated in over 70 countries.  And although other frameworks have been theorized since then 
(e.g., the Cultural Mosaic), they do not have the empirical support as does Hofstede’s five 
dimensions.  Thus, for this study, I will focus on Hofstede’s dimensions as the operationalization 
of cultural values. In applying cultural dimensions in research, many authors have chosen to use 
nationality as a proxy for culture to investigate cultural frameworks shown to relate to behavior.  
This strategy will be discussed in turn. 
Nationality as a Proxy for Culture 
Traditionally, researchers have focused on a top-down approach to studying culture, 
targeting aggregated levels of analysis, like the individuals’ nationality, which serves as a 
simplistic conceptualization aimed at describing a multidimensional construct (e.g., Chao & 
Moon, 2005).  Nationality is considered an alternative for studying culture because, generally, 
individuals from the same country often use the same language, have a similar history, share a 
geographic location; thus, they are assumed to share a “foundation on which a culture can 
emerge and maintained” (Smith, 2008).  Also, research has supported that national culture 
accounted between 25 and 50 percent of variation in attitudes (Burke, Wilson, & Salas, 2008; 
Gannon, 1994).   
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Although using nationality is convenient and a common practice, there is one main 
shortfall –underestimating the diversity within the country (Matsumoto, 2003).  As a result, 
researchers also collect and report demographic information to measure the similarities and/or 
representativeness of the country’s participants.  
Though using nationality as culture’s surrogate presents this weakness, it is a practical 
measure for basic cultural research.  Understanding the basic cultural dynamics among 
teammates is vital—that is, how people from different nationalities interact with each other in 
teams.  More specifically, do Americans working in teams with other Americans interact 
differently than teams solely composed of individuals from Bulgaria? The answers to these 
questions regarding the expectations of homogeneous team interactions can then be used to 
develop research hypotheses and practical recommendations for heterogeneous team interactions.   
In this study, the participants are from Bulgaria, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the 
United States.  After examining the most recent culture values from these and neighboring 
countries, it provided more support for their inclusion and national-level comparisons.   
Although cross-cultural psychology researchers often focus on the national level of culture, they 
operationalize the construct via underlying, empirically-supported values (e.g., Hofstede’s 
cultural values).  For example, House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta (2004) examined 
the societal practice and value scores of In-Group Collectivism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty 
Avoidance in the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) study.  
Of the five countries examined in this study, the GLOBE researchers examined the cultural 
differences among the Netherlands, Sweden, and the U. S.  The countries’ scores on In-Group 
Collectivism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty Avoidance were banded into separate groups 
based on mean scores.  For In-Group Collectivism practice scores, all three countries were 
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banded together; however, their value scores (index analogous to Hofstede’s values) were all 
separated in different bands (see Appendix B for GLOBE study values).  For Power Distance, 
the U. S. and Sweden were banded together and separated from the Netherlands for both their 
practice and value scores.  Finally, the Netherlands and the U. S. were banded together for 
Uncertainty Avoidance practice scores.  This pattern was not mirrored in their value scores as all 
three countries were in separate bands for their value scores.  The results of this study provide 
support for using nationality as a proxy for culture, especially for the countries included in this 
study.  Moreover, nationality accounted for 25% to 50% of variance in attitudes (Burke, Wilson, 
& Salas; Gannon, 1994).  However, nationality is considered the outer layer of culture with the 
underlying cultural values as a deeper layer.  Thus, an examination of the cultural values that 
have sustained the literature over time will be further discussed in the following section.  
 
Cultural Values and Teams 
In the current study, the teams were composed of Military Officers from the same nation.  
The cultural values developed by Hofstede are well suited for this study as they originated with 
the purpose of targeting nationality differences and have been linked to team processes and 
outcomes.  In this study, only Individualism – Collectivism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty 
Avoidance will be considered, with explanations of their inclusion in the sections that follow.  
For collectivism, there is an identity of “we”, which would lend a more conducive environment 
for team processes and outcomes.  Bond and Smith (Thompson & Gooler, 1996) reported that 
Individualism / Collectivism and Power Distance statistically predicted compliance with group 
norms beyond various demographic variables (Bond & Smith, 1996; Carr, 2004).  Of all 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance were cited as the 
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two that can hinder group performance (Paulus, Bichelmeyer, Malopinsky, Pereira, & Rastogi, 
2005; Van Hook, 2000).  However, Hofstede (1991; 2001) stressed that only Power Distance 
holds influence on team relationships (Paulus, Bichelmeyer, Malopinsky, Pereira, & Rastogi, 
2005).  House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta (2004) clarified a possible theoretical 
relation between Collectivism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty Avoidance.  The authors stated 
that collectivism may be an uncertainty avoidance strategy, that is, with more people they can 
overcome any uncertainty presented—“united we stand, divided we fall” (p. 625).  In support of 
these proposed relations, Hofstede reported a significant negative correlation between UAI and 
Individualism (r = -.35, p < .05, across 40 countries; 1984, p. 213; House, Hanges, Javidan, 
Dorfman, and Gupta, 2004, p. 625).  Further, the GLOBE Uncertainty Avoidance practices and 
Institutional Collectivism practices were positively related (r = .40, p < .01, across 61 cultures; 
House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004, p. 626).  Also, the GLOBE study authors 
posited that presenting structure, organization, rules and protocol may be a defense for 
uncertainty, such that when faced with a novel dilemma, expectations are already in place to 
address the situation.  The authors also noted a strong negative correlation between GLOBE 
Uncertainty Avoidance practices and Power distance values.  This finding suggests that highly-
structured societies no longer support power hierarchies in their current practices.  Most 
importantly, Sutton, Pierce, Burke, and Salas (2006) stated that three cultural dimensions 
influence multicultural teamwork: Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Individualism / 
Collectivism.  The relations among Individualism, Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance 
will be examined in this study in order to explore whether the relations among these variables 
reflect those of Hofstede three decades later.   
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Although this study provides a valuable opportunity to explore three of Hofstede’s 
culture variables as they relate to team performance, two of his culture variables, Long-Term / 
Short-Term Orientation and Masculinity / Femininity, will not be examined. Long-term 
orientation will be excluded because the team task was a short-term task. Masculinity/Femininity 
is excluded because I do not expect a large amount of variability on Masculinity/Femininity in a 
sample of male NATO officers. Thus, in the following section, I will summarize the research on 
the influences of Individualism, Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance on information 
sharing and team performance. 
Cultural Dimensions, Information Sharing and Team Performance 
Culture and Information Sharing 
To date, there are few empirical studies examining the contributors to communication in 
multicultural teams (Riedel, 2008). “However, understanding the differences in world views 
between cultures is essential to good communication” (p. 6-4). Klein and Steele-Johnson (2002) 
conceptualized the Cultural Lens Model, which posits that life experiences (with families and the 
environment) shape how people think, their perceptions of the world, and interactions with 
others.  According to the authors, in general, people from the same national culture share a 
cultural lens –having the tendency to view the world in a similar way.  Thus, the cultural lens 
provides significance in how people understand others’ words, gestures, and intentions when 
communicating that goes beyond language barriers (Riedel, 2008).  Further, it should be 
expected that individuals working within homogeneous teams should have less 
miscommunication because, not only is language not an issue, they share a similar cultural lens.  
People within a culture tend to adopt the attitudes, customs, and beliefs characteristic of their 
culture (Riedel, 2008, p. 6-5).  Studying these homogeneous teams from various countries will 
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provide (a) empirical support for understanding how other cultures communicate in teams and 
(b) implications for working in multicultural teams. 
Triandis (2000) contends that the cultural dimensions proposed by Hofstede (1980) and 
those of others “are important in communication because a culture’s position on the dimensions 
influences cues in the communication interaction to which the person pays attention” (Riedel, 
2008, p. 6-6).   One of the problems that lead to miscommunication in multicultural 
environments is information sharing—thus, it is important to see how homogeneous teams 
exchange information.   “A problem that plagues [multinational teams] is the inability or 
unwillingness of team members to share mission-related information with team members of 
other cultures” (p. 6-3).  Assuming this is true, could it not be assumed that teams with lower 
variance in cultural values would engage in more information sharing than in teams with greater 
variance? Additionally, would there be more unique, rather than open, information sharing 
occurring? Will differences across cultures in information sharing yield similar team 
performance?  The answers to these questions will help in understanding the role of culture with 
information sharing in homogeneous-culture teams.   
As previously mentioned, a lack of information sharing within teams has been shown to 
degrade the quality of mental models and jeopardize mission success.  But, can it be possible that 
some cultures do not engage in active verbal information exchange in ad-hoc teams and still 
attain mission success?  I will examine the basic communicative interaction patterns within 
teams from five different cultures, describing how the patterns differ across cultures, and they 
relate to team performance.  In the following sections, I will provide an overview of how 
Hofstede’s Individualism-Collectivism, Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance dimensions 




Individualism – Collectivism: Me Versus We 
The Individualism-Collectivism cultural continuum has received the most research 
attention across disciplines (Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1988; Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1986).  
Its attention has accelerated and pressed researchers to revisit the construct.  As a result, 
Individualism and Collectivism constructs have been coined and tested—“Gesellschaft” and 
“Gemeinschaft” (Tonnies, 1887; 2002), “Agency” and “Communion” (Bakan, 1966), 
“Independent” and “Interdependent” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Sutton & Pierce, 2003) .   The 
premise of this dimension is that in different societies, there is more emphasis on the role of the 
individual as compared to the needs of the group (Hofstede, 1980).  Hofstede refers to societies 
that give priority to the group as collectivist, and those who cater to the individual as 
individualist.  Interestingly, the vast majority of the world’s population lives in collectivist 
cultures, where it is expected that children are raised with their extended family.  Within the 
collectivist cultures, the power is deferred to the group.  “Group membership in a collectivist 
culture is much less a matter of choice than in an individualist culture, whether that choice be 
determined by one’s family of origin or by the organization for which one works” (Smith, 1992, 
p. 41).  Hence, decisions are made in the interest of the collective.  Therefore, in teams, the 
accountability in collective societies is for the team (Hofstede, 1980). 
On the contrary, in individualist societies, children are raised with their close family 
members—parents and siblings—referred to as the nuclear family.  There is less contact with 
extended family members, therefore a reduced concern for these individuals.  Individuals in 
these cultures are expected to be accountable for only themselves, with less regard for others if 
working on a team.  Team objectives maintain clear individual responsibilities, so that when 
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team performance is sub-par, it is evident where the responsibility lies.  As implied, the power is 
deferred to the person in individualist teams.  Further, when team decisions are being made, each 
team member is concerned about self-promotion. (Hofstede, 1980). 
Some research has regarded the IC dimension as the most important cultural dimension 
that explains differences, as well as similarities, in communication (Gudykunst & Mody, 2002; 
Riedel, 2008). There are some theories developed in the social psychology literature that will 
lend support for the I-P-O model and hypotheses presented in this study, specifically Social 
Identity Theory, Low- versus High-Context Cultures, and Direct and Indirect Communication.  
Each will be detailed in the following paragraphs. 
Social Identity Theory.  According to Myers (2005), individuals not only consider 
personal identity in their self-concept, but also define themselves by their groups.  For example, I 
consider myself as a woman, a Belizean-born US citizen, a classically-trained dancer, a UCF 
PhD student, and a daughter in the McCoy family.   People carry similar group identities when 
answering “Who am I?”.  Social identity theory suggests that three trends occur: (a) 
categorization, (b) identification, and (c) comparison.  During categorization, people place labels 
on others to reduce cognitive overload; that is, saying someone is a PhD student or an American 
provides inferences about the person’s qualities.  When identifying people, individuals are 
connected to certain groups, considered the in-group.  As a consequence, individuals compare 
themselves with other groups (out-groups), resulting in more favorable evaluations of those 
within the in-groups:   
“Having a sense of ‘we-ness’ strengthens our self-concepts.  It feels good.  We seek not 
only respect for ourselves but pride in our groups” (Myers, 2005, p. 351; Smith & Tyler, 




The tendency to view one’s in-group more favorably is referred to as in-group bias.  In-
group bias has implications for group communication and team performance.  When favoring 
one’s own in-group, it can be assumed that individuals would share more information within the 
group to ensure its success.  This is especially true when the individuals have a strong identity 
connection with the group—they will have a higher self-esteem and a sense of belonging, and 
feel superior to those in the out-group.   
By definition, individual goals trump group goals in individualistic cultures, whereas, 
collectivists, by nature, tend to be more group oriented with their identity centered around “we”.  
They make clear distinctions between in-groups and out-groups, whereas individualistic people 
do not acknowledge a wide psychological distance between in-groups and out-groups.  In fact, 
the interdependent identity maintained by the collectivists embraces loyalty to group members, 
but discourages being a member of many in-groups.  Moreover, “collectivists tend to impose a 
large psychological distance between in-group and out-group members, and in-group members 
are expected to have unquestioning loyalty to their group” (Riedel, 2008, p. 6-7).  They even 
have more favorable evaluations of those in their in-group.  Furthermore, this differentiation 
between groups results in the tendency to have “less interaction and communication with the out-
group members, less information sharing, less value placed on their contributions, and fewer 
assignments given to those perceived as out-group members” (Riedel, 2008, p. 6-7; Salas et al., 
2004).  Leveraging from the literature, it is expected that collectivists would engage in more 
supporting behavior within teams, considering that their driving goal is to achieve team 
objectives, leaving individual motivations aside.  Thus, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: Individualism is expected to moderate the relation between information 
sharing content and team performance.  Specifically, a higher correlation between 
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supporting behavior and team performance is expected for teams scoring lower on 
Individualism than for teams scoring higher on Individualism.   
Figure 2. Hypothesis 2a: Individualism moderating the relation between Supporting Behavior 
and Team Performance 
 
Low- versus High-Context Cultures.  Hall and Hall (1990) explained the difference 
between low- and high-context cultures. According to the authors, there is an overlap with IC, in 
that the high- and low-context communication styles are more represented in collectivist and 
individualistic cultures, respectively.  Riedel (2008) named the United States, Germany, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom as low-context countries.  The languages spoken in these countries 
abound in proverbs and sayings that confirm the importance of these characteristics—“There is 
no learning without questioning” (Israel), “the squeaky wheel gets the grease” (United States), 
“He who stirs another’s porridge burns his own” (Germany), “Little is done where many 
command” (Netherlands) (Reynolds & Valentine, 2004, p. 5).  This preference can be echoed in 
Edward Hall’s “low context” communication style, where there is a partiality for unambiguous 








cultures are considered high-context.  In contrast, collectivism has been associated with intuitive, 
indirect, and complex communication, requiring people to “read between the lines”. Proverbs 
from collective cultures illustrate these values: “The nail that stands out will get hammered” 
(Japan), “The duck that squawks gets shot first” (China), “Behind an able man there are always 
other able men”, (Korea), “The sheep that’s separated from the flock is eaten by the wolf” 
(Turkey), “There is no wisdom without the group” (Mongolia), “When the spider webs unite, 
they can tie up a lion” (Africa) (p.8, Reynolds & Valentine).  Similar relations can be found for 
high-context communication, in which people rely on implicit communication. 
In low-context cultures, there is less appreciation for the non-verbal context of 
communication; there is more reliance on explicit and direct communication. People in these 
cultures “seek information that emphasized personal or individual aspects rather than social or 
group aspects” (Riedel, 2008, p. 6-10; Ting-Toomey, 1988).  Conversely, high-context cultures 
depend more on coded language and non-verbal cues.  More importantly for information sharing, 
high-context cultures respond favorably to silence.   Because individualists are expected to more 
vocal about their agreements, as well as disagreements, and uncertainties, it is expected that their 
information sharing content would reflect more of a proportion of these exchanges than teams 
that are more collectivistic.  Therefore, the following hypothesis is presented: 
Hypothesis 2b: Individualism is expected to moderate the relation between information 
sharing content and team performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between 
information exchange and team performance is expected for teams scoring higher on 






Figure 3. Hypothesis 2b: Individualism moderating the relation between Information Exchange 
and Team Performance. 
 
Direct versus Indirect Communication.  The research supports that collectivists prefer 
indirect communication—“implicit language carefully imbues messages within a more positive 
tone to decrease the chances of unpleasant encounters, direct confrontations, and disagreements” 
(Riedel, 2008, p. 6-7; Gudykunst, Matsumoto, Ting-Toomey, Nishida, Kim, & Heyman, 1996).  
However, they more often speak using words of uncertainty like “maybe”, “perhaps”, and 
“somewhat” and avoid negative reactions when communicating to avoid losing face (i.e., self-
respect or pride) and maintain harmony within the group.  Because maintaining relationships are 
esteemed in collectivist cultures, avoiding confrontation is critical.  Further, in Conyne, Wilson, 
Tang, and Shi’s (1999) study, they reported that collectivist team members displayed more 
hesitancy to speak when sharing information.  The authors posited that this was due to an 
indecision to speak that was primarily influenced by culture.  Not only are collectivists hesitant 








expression, see speaking out as a means of resolving problems, and are likely to use 
confrontational strategies when dealing with interpersonal problems” (Riedel, 2008, p. 6-8).  
Individualists value clarity and directness—a “say what you mean and mean what you say” 
communication style.  With their focus on understanding the task, rather than building and 
maintaining relationships, individualists perceive directness as valuable in information sharing 
and accomplishing goals.  With individualist team members expected to be less concerned about 
losing face and more vocal about how the performance of team members, whether good or poor, 
the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2c: Individualism is expected to moderate the relation between information 
sharing content and team performance.  Specifically, a higher correlation between team 
reinforcement/punishment and team performance is expected for teams scoring higher on 
Individualism than for teams scoring lower on Individualism.   
Figure 4. Hypothesis 2c: Individualism moderating the relation between Team Reinforcement / 











Power Distance: Examining Social Inequalities 
Hofstede defined Power Distance as “the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organizations with a country expect and accept that power is distributed 
unequally. ‘Institutions’ are the basic elements of society like the family, school, and the 
community; ‘organizations’ are the places where people work” (Hofstede, 1991, p. 28).  This 
construct is conceptualized from the perspective of the less powerful members, suggesting that 
the degree of inequality within the society is endorsed by the subordinates as well as the leaders. 
The power distance index measures the dependence relationships in a particular country; ranging 
from lower Power Distance countries (e.g., United States, Great Britain) where one could expect 
that subordinates would approach and / or contradict their bosses without anxiety to higher 
Power Distance countries (e.g., Latin European and Latin American countries, Asian, and 
African countries) where one would expect that subordinates understand their lower position on 
the ladder, making it unlikely for them to approach their superiors directly (Hofstede, 1991).   
With regard to information sharing, low Power Distance individuals use less formal 
modes of communication; they challenge ideas in unconventional ways to find innovative 
answers to problems.  They do not find it offensive to question power holders, emphasize their 
personal rights, and defend their beliefs so that their point is heard.  Thus, the hierarchical 
protocol established within the organization does not thwart them from asserting vital 
information to improve performance. 
These information sharing trends are not reflected in high Power Distance teams.  For 
example, Smith and his colleagues have reported that managers working in high Power-
Distanced societies report using more formal rules in their daily operations (Smith, Peterson & 
Misumi, 1994; Smith, Peterson & Schwartz, 2002).  Within these societies, subordinates are also 
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fearful of questioning or disputing their managers (Adsit, London, Crom, & Jones, 1997), relying 
more on following orders.  More importantly, subordinates may fail to provide critical 
information to leaders, believing it is the leader’s responsibility to make decisions (Helmreich, 
2000; Riedel, 2008). Or they may fail to challenge a commander’s decision, even if it could 
result in catastrophic consequences.  Due to the differences in superior-subordinate interactions 
that Power Distance can present, this cultural dimension can be problematic for team outcomes, 
but the results are empirically clear.  The theoretical propositions would suggest that as the 
distance in power widens, there would be increases in formal protocol and more emphasis on 
providing direction to team members to ensure superior task performance than for teams that 
perceive the power distance to be more shared (or shortened).  Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is presented: 
Hypothesis 3: Power Distance is expected to moderate the relation between information 
sharing content and team performance.  Specifically, a higher correlation between 
directing tasks and team performance is expected for teams scoring higher on Power 
Distance than for teams scoring lower on Power Distance. 









Uncertainty Avoidance: Adapt or Not to Adapt? 
Uncertainty avoidance refers to the extent to which “a society feels threatened by 
uncertain and ambiguous situations and tries to avoid these situations by providing greater career 
stability, establishing more formal rules, not tolerating deviant ideas and behaviors, and 
believing in absolute truths and the attainment of expertise” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 45).  
Unstructured situations are more accepted in societies that are characterized by low uncertainty 
avoidance, like Canada, United Kingdom, Denmark, India, France, Hong Kong, Sweden, and the 
United States (Riedel, 2008).  People from low uncertainty avoidance cultures tolerate 
disagreement and healthy conflict. Individuals are able to adapt easily, are able and willing to 
manage change without much stress.  Moreover, rules and protocol are not formalized and 
inflexible as in high uncertainty avoidance cultures. Individuals cope with the ever-changing and 
unpredictable environment by enforcing few rules and accepting of other people’s opinions. 
Further, dissent and conflict are seen as natural and effective making the ability to cope and 
change with the uncertainty easier in these societies. “Low uncertainty avoidance cultures are 
characterized by low stress, acceptance of dissent, high level of risk-taking, and few rituals” 
(Riedel, 2008, p. 6-9).   Risk-taking and few rituals also characterize this culture, which can 
breed more flexibility, unique perspectives, and higher gains of performance.  However, team 
leaders who are low on uncertainty avoidance may not provide enough structure and details 
regarding the mission—perhaps withholding pertinent information needed for the team to do the 
tasks.  
In contrast, societies that are high on uncertainty avoidance employ strict rules and norm 
expectations that are weaved into a belief of absolute Truth to reduce the probability of engaging 
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in novel situations.  Countries that are said to be high on uncertainty avoidance include 
Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Egypt, Greece, Japan, and Mexico (Riedel, 2008).  
In a study by Rifkind and Harper (1993), they found that employees in high Uncertainty 
Avoidance cultures preferred transparent instruction, specialized jobs and cooperation with 
others.  Team members who are high on Uncertainty Avoidance tend to ask for excessive amount 
of guidance and information, stifling creativity and innovative input for the task (Riedel, 2008).  
Team leaders may attempt to control the situation so much to avoid uncertainty that the dialogue 
is not sufficient to develop situational awareness.  In this case, the team leader might be better 
off completing the task him/herself.  
Teams comprised of Uncertainty-Avoidant members aim at reducing uncertainty by 
developing a strategy, although the plan can provide problems later if it needs modification.  
Another unsettling characteristic is the tendency to ignore information that does not correspond 
to initial thought and feel threatened when the plan has to change (Ilgen, LePine, & Hollenbeck, 
1997).  Further, high Uncertainty-Avoidant members may prevent the team from adapting 
because they are limiting access to dissenting cues and stifling innovative solutions.  Interactions 
that are considered critical for team performance—consensus building, and considering all data, 
even dissenting information—were negatively related to high need for structure—a construct that 
is greatly correlated with high Uncertainty Avoidance.  Another team performance hindrance 
presented by high Uncertainty Avoidance is the reluctance to engage in risk-taking.  However, in 
the military, many of the missions are characterized by a consistent uncertain environment.  It 
could be suggested that when working in these military teams, it is beneficial to have some 
individuals who are low on Uncertainty Avoidance as to prevent mission jeopardy.  To 
summarize, team members who score higher on Uncertainty Avoidance tend to engage in more 
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planning to reduce the feeling of ambiguity, avoid dissenting information, and are reluctant to 
take risks.  Because developing a solid strategy is key to Uncertainty Avoidant cultures, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 4a: Uncertainty Avoidance is expected to moderate the relation between 
information sharing content and team performance.  Specifically, a higher correlation 
between planning and team performance is expected for teams scoring higher on 
Uncertainty Avoidance than for teams scoring lower on Uncertainty Avoidance. 
Figure 6. Hypothesis 4a: Uncertainty Avoidance moderating the relation between planning and 
team performance 
 
Additionally, recent research attention has turned to themes of uncertainty reduction and 
on a construct named Personal Need for Structure, which refers to a cognitive preference for 
structure and clarity (Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, 2001; Neuberg, Judice, & 
West, 1997; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).  For example, individuals who have high scores on 
Personal Need for Structure “prefer simplicity, precision, and structure in most situations, with 
ambiguity and grey areas proving troubling and uncomfortable” (Thompson, 2008, p. KN2-4).  








push for creating fast solutions.  Because their focus is on the task work, rather than teamwork, 
they are assertive about gaining group consensus early even if that requires rejecting dissenting 
information (i.e., groupthink becomes a concern).  Thus, they snub consensus building, team 
empowerment to voice opinions, and buy-in from the group—all requisites for team decision-
making effectiveness.  This style has been noted as “detrimental to the success of multinational 
coalitions” (Thompson, 2008, p. KN2-5).  The tendency to develop a strategy early and remain 
on task requires those proponents to continue to search and report data to their team that are 
aligned with supporting their strategy. This process allows for quietly dissenting team members 
to commit to the plan, increase team buy-in, and promote team unity.  In doing so, it is expected 
that those who possess a Personal Need for Structure and are Uncertainty Avoidant will provide 
many situation updates to ensure that the tasks are on time and the feedback on performance was 
acceptable.  Thus, the following hypothesis is provided: 
Hypothesis 4b: Uncertainty Avoidance is expected to moderate the relation between 
information sharing content and team performance. Specifically, a higher correlation 
between situation update and team performance is expected for teams scoring higher on 








Figure 7. Hypothesis 4b: Uncertainty Avoidance moderating the relation between situation 









The current study was conducted to understand the relations among culture, information 
sharing, and team performance.  To do so, I analyzed archival data originally collected under the 
NATO Human Factors & Medicine Panel-138, in the investigators conducted an experiment 
among a participant sample of NATO Officers from five countries (Bulgaria, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, and United States).  The experimental task involved having the participants 
complete individual difference and attitude questionnaires and participate in a computer-based 
task in teams of four.  The task was developed to be a true team experiment in that all of the team 
members did not hold the identical information.  In order to complete the mission of finding 
weapons caches, the team members had to virtually share information (e.g., typing and sharing 
information to the entire team).  All of the information was automatically collected throughout 
the experiment.  The participants’ ability to find the weapons caches and interact with the virtual 
characters in a culturally-appropriate manner affected the team performance score.  The criterion 
(team performance) was automatically calculated throughout the experiment, with increases and 
decreases of the score reported to the team.  After the experiment, the participants completed 
other measures regarding the team dynamics and perceived team performance.  The data 
collected from this experiment were analyzed to advance the industrial and organizational 
psychology research domain by examining teams from a non-Western lens.  A summary of the 
hypotheses can be found in Table 5 and depicted in Figure 8 below.  The Method section 





Table 5. Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 The information sharing is expected to positively predict team performance. 
Hypothesis 2a 
Individualism is expected to moderate the relation between information sharing 
content and team performance.  Specifically, a higher correlation between 
supporting behavior and team performance is expected for teams scoring lower 
on Individualism than for teams scoring higher on Individualism. 
Hypothesis 2b 
Individualism is expected to moderate the relation between information sharing 
content and team performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between 
information exchange and team performance is expected for teams scoring 
higher on Individualism than for teams scoring lower on Individualism. 
Hypothesis 2c 
Individualism is expected to moderate the relation between information sharing 
content and team performance.  Specifically, a higher correlation between team 
reinforcement/punishment and team performance is expected for teams scoring 
higher on Individualism than for teams scoring lower on Individualism. 
Hypothesis 3 
Power Distance is expected to moderate the relation between information 
sharing content and team performance.  Specifically, a higher correlation 
between directing tasks and team performance is expected for teams scoring 
higher on Power Distance than for teams scoring lower on Power Distance. 
Hypothesis 4a 
Uncertainty Avoidance is expected to moderate the relation between 
information sharing content and team performance.  Specifically, a higher 
correlation between planning and team performance is expected for teams 
scoring higher on Uncertainty Avoidance than for teams scoring lower on 
Uncertainty Avoidance. 
Hypothesis 4b 
Uncertainty Avoidance is expected to moderate the relation between 
information sharing content and team performance. Specifically, a higher 
correlation between situation update and team performance is expected for 



























































CHAPTER THREE: METHOD 
Participants   
The study participants included a sample of 48 four-person teams (yielding a total of 192 
individuals), representing five countries: Bulgaria (n = 8), the Netherlands (n = 8), Norway (n = 
16), Sweden (n = 9), and United States (n = 7). The participant characteristics required for 
inclusion were that they were male officers with a rank of OF-1 to OF-4, between the ages of 18-
35. Within teams, the members were of the same rank. Other requirements were normal, or 
corrected-to-normal vision, and familiarity with computer use (e.g., mouse, keyboard).  They had 
to ethnically and culturally identify with the nation under study and reported to not have spent 
more than 6 months between the ages of one and 18 living outside of the nation under study.  
Further, they had to have completed or were currently enrolled in college. Finally, the study was 
limited to those who were fluent in written English.  
Measures 
Background Information.  The participants completed a Background Information 
questionnaire that had 19 items eliciting demographic information (e.g., age, sex, nationality, 
languages, education, rank, computer and game experience; see Appendix B).   
Culture Values. The Hofstede Value Survey Module 1994 (VSM 94) Culture Survey was 
administered to assess the five cultural values (Individualism, Power Distance, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, Long-Term Orientation, and Masculinity) for each participant.  The VSM 94 
includes 20 items (four for each subscale).  All of the items are scored on a five-point scale, but 
varied on response formats.  The items asked for ratings of either (a) importance (“Of Utmost 
Importance” to “Of Very Little Importance”), (b) agreement (“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly 
Agree”), or (c) frequency.  An example item is “Competition between employees usually does 
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more harm than good.”  Although the VSM 94 is widely used, there is limited information about 
the psychometric properties of this measure by the author.  Further, no information about the 
reliability and construct validity of the five dimension was provided in Hofstede’s (1994) manual 
(Spector, Cooper, & Sparks, 2001).  Relying on the psychometric properties provided by 
Spector, Cooper, & Spark’s (2001) critique, the following are the reported internal consistencies 
for the subscales: Individualism (alpha = 0.57), Power Distance (alpha = 0.64), Uncertainty 
Avoidance (alpha = 0.49), Long-Term Orientation (alpha = 0.74), and Masculinity (alpha = 
0.29).  Although the cultural values were collected from each of the participant, the values 
reported in the database were not used for this study for two reasons.  Hofstede (2001) reiterates 
that the cultural values are to be collected and reported to reflect a national-level index. The 
sample size for these analyses was only 48, with homogeneous teams representing between 7 and 
16 teams.  This amount of data is limited to reflect a national-level cultural value.  Second, and 
most important, the values reported in the database were not to scale for interpretation as they 
should be in accordance to Hofstede’s guidance.  Moreover, many of the values exceeded 100, 
with Hofstede’s values ranging from 0-100. Thus, to respond to this discrepancy and to address a 
national level, I consulted the national cultural values reported on Hofstede’s website.  The 
values for Power Distance, Individualism, and Uncertainty Avoidance were provided for all five 







Table 6. Hofstede Cultural Value Scores 
Country Power Distance Individualism Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Bulgaria 70 30 85 
Netherlands 38 80 53 
Norway 31 69 50 
Sweden 31 71 29 
USA 40 91 46 
 
Information Sharing Coding.  Typed messages by all team members during the team task 
were automatically collected by the computer program.  There were three steps involved in 
developing the information sharing coding system: (a) reviewing coding systems in the literature 
and developing a preliminary coding system; (b) testing theoretical model with a card sort 
technique with a doctoral student team; and (c) review, revise, tryout, and finalize the coding 
system with the research assistant coding team.  STEP 1: To develop the coding system, I 
reviewed existing coding systems in the literature to examine their capability to code this study’s 
data (e.g., Rosen, 2010; Smith-Jentsch, Campbell, Milanovich, & Reynolds, 2001). Rosen (2010) 
presented six communication coding processes, each with at least one sub-dimension: Team 
Information Exchange (Information Provision, Information Request), Team Knowledge Sharing 
(Knowledge Provision, Knowledge Request), Team Solution Option Generation (Option 
Generation-Part, Option Generation-Full), Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives 
(Solution Evaluation), Team Process and Plan Regulation (Goal/Task Orientation, Situation 
Update/Request, Reflection), and Other (Simple Agree/Disagree/Acknowledgements, 
Fillers/Incomplete/Exclamation, Tangent/Off-Task, Uncertainty). Because of the difference in 
nature of the current study and that of Rosen (e.g., coders in Rosen’s study were aware of what 
was presented on the computer screen), I consulted another study that employed a categorical 
system from Team Dimensional Training (TDT).  Smith-Jentsch et al. (2001) presented four 
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dimensions and 11 subcategories as an expert mental model of teamwork: Information Exchange 
(Utilizing information from all available resources, Passing information before being asked, 
Providing situation updates), Communication (Using proper phraseology, Providing complete 
reports, Using clear communication, Using brief communication), Supporting Behavior 
(Correcting errors, Requesting and providing backup), Initiative/Leadership (Providing guidance, 
Stating clear priorities). STEP 2: After examining the coding system dimensions and definitions, 
I developed the first version. Two coding teams were recruited to finalize the information 
sharing coding system.  The first team of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) consisted of five I/O 
psychology doctoral students.  The SMEs were presented with individual information sharing 
messages that were collected from the heterogeneous teams that participated in the original 
NATO HFM study.  They were blind to the study participant who typed the message, to whom 
the message was sent, and what country he represented.  The students each read the individual 
message and conducted a card sort, as documented in the development procedure for the TDT 
mental model.  After the completion of the individual card sort, the students discussed the 
number, messages, and labels of their groups.  The students then finalized their coding system by 
consensus using the actual information sharing data.  I compared the coding system that was 
derived theoretically from the literature to that of what the doctoral student team developed and 
made some revisions.   
STEP 3: A second team of four graduate I/O psychology students (one doctoral and three 
Master’s students) and one post-baccalaureate student served as coders for this study. The team 
of five reviewed the experimenter’s guide to familiarize themselves with the study.  The team 
was provided with an introduction to the current study and the coding system.  To train the team 
on the coding system, the team met in a classroom and each dimension, sub-category, and 
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respective definitions were reviewed. In the same session, they were provided with examples of 
information sharing messages collected from the heterogeneous teams and discussed the most 
appropriate coding system dimension. Any discrepancies were discussed and rationales were 
provided for the coding.  After the initial training session, the team coded data (550 statements) 
from the mixed-culture teams for the following week for practice and to examine their coding 
agreement.  The mixed-culture data were chosen for training as they were not to be included in 
the analyses for this study, but allow for a realistic preview of the data from the culturally-
homogeneous teams.  We met again and discussed all codes to facilitate a shared mental model. 
Definitions for some of the dimensions were discussed and further refined.  This training process 
continued weekly as all eight heterogeneous teams were analyzed.  After the training period, the 
final coding system consisted of seven categories (Appendix A):  Task Direction (Task Action), 
Situation Update (Teammate’s Current Action, Update on the Simulation/Task, Progress), 
Planning (Roles/Responsibilities, Goal Setting, Strategy, Task Option Generation), Supporting 
Behavior (Backup Behavior), Information Exchange (Agreement, Disagreement, 
Uncertainty/Indifference, Greetings), Team Reinforcement/Punishment (Exclamation, Positive 
Reinforcement/Positive Emoticon, Negative Comments/Negative Emoticon), Other 
(Incomplete/Filler/Miscellaneous).   
After training, the coders were provided with the data in separate Excel files for each 
team.  As in the training, they were blind to the study participant who typed the message, to 
whom the message was sent, and what country he represented.  They were instructed to read the 
message and type the number of the information sharing sub-category code in the column 
adjacent to the message.  Every week, the coders completed the coding for numerous teams 
(ranging from four to twelve teams), with the number of teams dependent on the amount of 
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messages communicated among the study participants. There were three coders for the coding 
content analyses.  I analyzed agreement by calculating the percentage of statements of when the 
three coders selected the same coding content area for each statement in relation to the total 
statements for each team.  More specifically, if two coders agreed on the content area for a 
statement, but one disagreed, that statement was coded as a disagreement.  If all three selected 
different content areas, that statement was coded as a disagreement.  Only when all three coders 
selected the same content area for the statement was when the statement was analyzed as 
agreement.  To complete the agreement analyses, I coded all agreements as "1" and 
disagreements as "0", then calculated the percentage by dividing the total agreements over total 
statements for that team, which yielded an agreement ratio. I color coded discrepancies and 
reported the results to the research assistant team.  This procedure continued until all of the 
initial coding was completed (approximately eight weeks).  I examined the coding agreement 
percentage for all of the data for this study.  The mean agreement percentage was 60%, which 
indicated that 40% of the statements coded had at least one coder to disagree on the content area.  
To resolve these coding discrepancies, the coding team met in person, engaged in discussion, and 
came to consensus for all of the coding disagreements.   
Team Performance. Team Performance was automatically collected by the computer 
program.  Performance for each team was generated by a metric regarded as a “Goodwill Score”, 
with the result dependent on their interactions with avatars in order to complete the mission.  The 
mission is to search for hidden weapons caches inside and outside of buildings.  Each team is 
instructed to maximize their Goodwill Score by interacting with virtual characters within the 
town and find the caches.  The score is only provided for the entire team (there is no individual 
performance score) and all members are provided with real-time feedback on each time a 
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member gains or loses points for the team. The Goodwill Score is calculated based on their 
ability to find these caches.  The maximum number of weapons that each team can find in the 
town is 20: four outdoors, 12 indoors, and four indoors that exist for a short period of time.  
Considering that each indoor cache is worth 300 Goodwill points and each outdoor cache is 
worth 100 points, the maximum points that each team can gain based on the search are 5200.  
The teams can also earn up to 530 additional points by accomplishing other tasks unrelated to the 
mission (e.g., recover a stolen necklace, find a missing child, assist police with criminals).  Thus, 
the team can gain a maximum of 5730; however, attaining this score is unlikely.  Because there 
are approximately 40 houses, 10 empty crates, and two trapped crates, the team could 
theoretically lose up to 3500 Goodwill points.  Losing the maximum points is also unlikely.  
Although finding the weapons caches is a primary indicator of the team performance, the 
members have to also avoid penalties to maximize their Goodwill score. 
 
Procedure  
 Principal investigators volunteered to supervise the data collection from the participating 
countries.  NATO Officers were randomly assigned to team roles (e.g., “Nathaniel”, “Frank”, 
“Jacob”, and “William”).  To familiarize themselves with their role and task assignments, the 
experimenter led a training session before the experiment commenced.  The experiment was 
based on the Situation Authorable Behavior Research Environment game-based testbed that used 
the “Neverwinter Nights™” computer program.  The main objective of the mission was to 
collaborate team efforts to find simulated weapons caches while maintaining positive 
relationships with the local populace.  As previously mentioned, communication was 
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automatically recorded for all participant during the task.  The Goodwill Score was automatically 





CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
To analyze the hypotheses in this study, I used Multiple Regression Analysis using 
IBM’s Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), Version 16.0. Details are provided 
below for each hypothesis, beginning with descriptive data. 
Descriptive Data 
Table 7 provides the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the 
variables of interest.  As shown, the coded information sharing content areas were all 
significantly correlated with each other, except for Supporting Behavior.  The total amount of 
information sharing was positively correlated with team performance (r = .33, p < .05).  The 
information sharing dimension that was significantly related to overall team performance was 
Situation Update (r = .42, p < .01). Situation Update was the information sharing content that 
was most strongly correlated with total information sharing (r = .93, p < .01), with all of the 
other content areas having similarly high correlations with total information sharing except for 
Support Behavior.  That is, as the Situation Updates increased during the team task, the total 
information sharing also increased.  Moreover, the more that teams engaged in Task Direction, 
Planning, Supporting Behavior, Information Exchange, and Reinforcement / Punishment, the 
more information sharing was observed.  However, Supporting Behavior was not related to total 
information sharing. 
The cultural dimensions correlated with many information sharing content areas.  
Specifically, Power Distance was negatively related to Task Direction (r =-0.53, p < .01), 
Situation Update (r = -0.53, p < .01), Planning (r = -0.41, p < .01), Information Exchange (r = -
0.51, p < .01), Team Reinforcement /Punishment (r = -0.39, p < .01), and Total IS (r = -0.57, p < 
.01).  Likewise, but with positive correlations, Individualism was significantly related to Task 
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Direction (r =0.51, p < .01), Situation Update (r = 0.75, p < .01), Planning (r = 0.65, p < .01), 
Information Exchange (r = 0.49, p < .01), Team Reinforcement /Punishment (r = 0.63, p < .01), 
and Total IS (r = 0.71, p < .01).  Finally, Uncertainty Avoidance was negatively related to Task 
Direction (r =-0.51, p < .01), Situation Update (r = -0.54, p < .01), Planning (r = -0.41, p < .01), 
Information Exchange (r = -0.50, p < .01), Team Reinforcement /Punishment (r = -0.39, p < .01), 
and Total IS (r = -0.55, p < .01).   
Not surprisingly, there were high correlations among the culture variables with Power 
Distance being negatively related to Individualism (r = -0.79, p < .01) and positively to 
Uncertainty Avoidance (r = -0.89, p < .01), and Individualism negatively related to Uncertainty 
Avoidance (r = -0.77, p < .01).  These very high correlations among the culture dimensions 
suggest substantial overlap between the three cultural dimensions and can explain why they 
correlate similarly with the information sharing content areas.  The most common information 
sharing content used by all teams was Situation Update (32.77% of all IS) followed by Task 
Direction (25.19%), Planning (19.12%), Information Exchange (14.90%), and Supporting 
Behavior (0.52%).  The infrequent use of Supporting Behavior explains the lack of relations with 




Table 7. Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations 
Variable M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Task Direction  
92.44 
(52.72) -            
2. Situation Update  
120.52 
(59.93) .76
** -           
3. Planning  
69.42 
(32.45) .46
** .63** -          
4. Supporting Behavior  
1.92 
(2.02) .04 .18 -.01 -         
5. Information Exchange  
54.67 
(34.22) .73
** .72** .59** -.02 -        














** .93** .74** .09 .86** .73** .75** -     
9. Team Performance  
803.96 
(437.13) .16 .42
** .25 .08 .26 .26 .25 .33* -    
10. Power Distance  
39.98 
(14.03) -.53
** -.53** -.41** -.17 -.51** -.39** -.31* -.57** .07 -   
11. Individualism  
67.92 
(18.74) .51





** -.54** -.41** -.19 -.50** -.39** -.21 -.55** -.04 .89** -.77** - 
Note. N = 48.              





Hypothesis 1 proposed that there would be a relation between information sharing and 
team performance. To test this hypothesis, I correlated the total information sharing statements 
with the team performance score.  The information sharing-team performance correlation was 
statistically significant (r = .33, p = .02), suggesting that greater information sharing positively 
related to the teams’ performance on this task. 
Hypothesis 2a-c proposed that Individualism would moderate the relation between 
information sharing content and team performance.  To analyze these hypotheses, I employed 
steps cited in Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004). I first centered the information sharing content 
variables (Supporting Behavior for Hypothesis 2a, Information Exchange for Hypothesis 2b, and 
Reinforcement / Punishment for Hypothesis 2c) and Individualism (moderator variable).  I then 
created product terms to represent the interaction between the information sharing content 
variables and Individualism by multiplying them together. Finally, I structured three separate 
hierarchical multiple regression equations to test for moderating effects.   
For Hypothesis 2a, which tested the moderating effect of Individualism on the Supporting 
Behavior-team performance relation, team performance was regressed onto Individualism, 
Supporting Behavior, and the interaction between Individualism and Supporting Behavior.  The 
reduced model was not statistically significant, but the full model was significant, with a 
significant main effect of Individualism (β = .34) and a significant interaction term (F (3, 44) = 
3.27, p = .03; β = .35, p = .02), suggesting that Individualism significantly moderated the 
relation between Supporting Behavior and Team Performance.  Specifically, for those teams that 
scored low on Individualism, Supporting Behavior had a negative association to team 
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performance. Conversely, for the teams that scored high on Individualism, Supporting Behavior 
had a positive relation with team performance.  Interestingly, although the interaction was 
significant, it was in the opposite direction than proposed. Additionally, the model accounted for 
13% of the variance in team performance, with the interaction term accounting for an additional 
10% of the variance over the main effects. 
For additional information, Table 8 provides the statistical analysis results and Figure 9 
provides the graphical representation of the interaction.   
Table 8. Testing the Moderating Effect of Individualism on Supporting Behavior and Team 
Performance Using Hierarchical Multiple Regression 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Variable B SE β  B SE β 
Supporting Behavior 7.59 31.70 .04  -5.21 30.51 -.02 
Individualism  5.97 3.42 .26  7.86 3.33 .34* 
Supporting Behavior x 
Individualism 
    4.04 1.64 .35* 
F   1.70    3.27* 
Adjusted R2   .03    .13 
Note. N = 48 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Figure 9. Supporting Behavior x Individualism Interaction 
 
To test Hypothesis 2b, team performance was regressed onto Individualism, Information 
Exchange, and the interaction between Individualism and Information Exchange.  The reduced 
model was not statistically significant, but the full model was significant, with a significant main 
effect of Individualism (β = .76) and a significant interaction term (F (3, 44) = 4.68, p = .01, β = 
.65, p = .01).  These results suggest that Information Exchange had a positive relation with team 
performance for the high-scoring Individualist teams.  However, the relation was negative for 
teams that were lower on Individualism.  The model accounted for 19% of the variance in team 






























Table 9. Testing the Moderating Effect of Individualism on Information Exchange and Team 
Performance Using Hierarchical Multiple Regression 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Variable B SE β  B SE β 
Information Exchange 2.21 2.09 .17  .20 2.04 .02 
Individualism 4.13 3.81 .18  17.74 5.80 .76** 
Information Exchange x 
Individualism 
    .44 .15 .65** 
F   2.26    4.68** 
Adjusted R2   .05    .19 
Note. N = 48 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Figure 10. Information Exchange x Individualism Interaction 
 
For Hypothesis 2c, team performance was regressed on Individualism, Reinforcement / 
Punishment, and the interaction between Individualism and Reinforcement / Punishment.  The 
reduced model was not significant; however, the full model was statistically significant, with a 



























Reinforcement / Punishment interaction (F (3, 44) = 3.24, p = 03; β = .44, p = .03).  Specifically, 
the relation between Reinforcement / Punishment and team performance was positive for those 
teams high on Individualism and negative for those teams who were low on the cultural value.   
That is, for more Individualist teams, statements regarding Reinforcement and Punishment were 
stronger positive predictors of team performance.  In contrast, these statements were indicative 
of poorer performance scores for teams that did not score high on Individualism.  For further 
clarification, the analysis results and graphical representation of this interaction can be found on 
Table 10 and Figure 11, respectively.  In summary, the findings from the data analyses regarding 
Individualism as a moderator for information sharing and team performance were statistically 
significant; thus, Hypotheses 2b and 2c were supported, and there were effects for 2a, but not in 
the direction proposed. 
 
Table 10. Testing the Moderating Effect of Individualism on Reinforcement / Punishment and 
Team Performance Using Hierarchical Multiple Regression 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Variable B SE β  B SE β 
Reinforcement / 
Punishment  
15.09 18.61 .15  -12.21 21.36 -.12 




    2.28 .99 .44* 
F   2.02    3.24* 
Adjusted R2   .04    .13 
Note. N = 48 







Figure 11. Reinforcement / Punishment x Individualism Interaction 
 
To test Hypothesis 3, team performance was regressed onto Power Distance, Task 
Direction, and the interaction between Power Distance and Task Direction.  The reduced model 
was not statistically significant; however, the full model was significant, with significant main 
effects for Task Direction (β = .43), Power Distance (β = .85) and a significant interaction term 
(F (3, 44) = 2.86, p = 05; β = .65, p = .02).  The model accounted for 11% of the variance in team 
performance.  The finding suggests that those teams that scored higher on Power Distance 
performed better on the task than those teams that scored lower.  Further, the results show that 
the relation between Task Direction and team performance was positive for High-Power 
Distance teams and negative for Low-Power Distance teams; therefore, this analysis provides 
support for Hypothesis 3.  The results for this analysis can be found in Table 11 and the plotted 
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Table 11. Testing the Moderating Effect of Power Distance on Task Direction and Team 
Performance Using Hierarchical Multiple Regression 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Variable B SE β  B SE β 
Task Direction 2.31 1.41 .28  3.55 1.45 .43* 
Power Distance 6.78 5.30 .22  26.52 9.89 .85** 
Task Direction x Power 
Distance 
    .36 .16 .65* 
F   1.46    2.86* 
Adjusted R2   .02    .11 
Note. N = 48 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Figure 12. Task Direction x Power Distance Interaction 
 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b proposed that Uncertainty Avoidance was expected to moderate 
the relation between information sharing content (Planning for 4a and Situation Update for 4b) 
and Team Performance. To test Hypothesis 4a, team performance was regressed onto 
Uncertainty Avoidance, Planning, and the interaction between Uncertainty Avoidance and 




























statistically significant (F (3, 44) = 1.34, p = .26), providing no support for Hypothesis 4a (see 
Table 12 for details).    
Table 12. Testing the Moderating Effect of Uncertainty Avoidance on Planning and Team 
Performance Using Hierarchical Multiple Regression 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Variable B SE β  B SE β 
Planning 3.69 2.13 0.27  3.94 2.15 .29 
Uncertainty Avoidance 1.79 4.04 0.07  -2.23 5.62 -.09 
Planning x Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
    -.18 .17 -.22 
F   1.54    1.38 
Adjusted R2   .02    .02 
Note. N = 48 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
To test Hypothesis 4b, team performance was regressed onto Uncertainty Avoidance, 
Situation Update, and the interaction between Uncertainty Avoidance and Situation Update.  
Both the reduced model (F (2, 45) = 6.43, p = .00) and the full model were statistically 
significant (F (3, 44) = 4.35, p = .01).  Although the main effect for Situation Update was 
significant in the full model (β = .57), the Situation Update-Uncertainty Avoidance interaction 
was not statistically significant. Moreover, Uncertainty Avoidance did not present any change in 
strength in the relations between information sharing content and team performance.  Thus, there 





Table 13. Testing the Moderating Effect of Uncertainty Avoidance on Situation Update and 
Team Performance Using Hierarchical Multiple Regression 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Variable B SE β  B SE β 
Situation Update 4.05 1.13 .56**  4.16 1.16 .57** 
Uncertainty Avoidance 6.48 3.97 .25  4.10 5.59 .16 
Situation Update x 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
    -.05 .08 -.13 
F   6.43**    4.35** 
Adjusted R2   .19    .18 
Note. N = 48 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
In summary, most of information sharing dimensions was strongly correlated.  
Information sharing was also related to both team performance and culture.  Although there was 
high multicollinearity among the information sharing dimensions and cultural values, only 
Individualism and Power Distance were significant moderators for various Information Sharing 
content areas.  Unfortunately, Uncertainty Avoidance was not observed to be an influential factor 
for the Planning- and Situation Update-Team Performance relations.  A summary of the 




Table 14. Hypothesis Test Results 
 
Hypothesis Proposed Relation Result 
Hypothesis 1 The information sharing was expected to be positively 
correlated with team performance. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2a Individualism was expected to moderate the relation 
between information sharing content and team 
performance.  Specifically, a higher correlation between 
supporting behavior and team performance was expected 
for teams that scored low on Individualism than for teams 
scoring high on Individualism. 
Not Supported 
(interactive effects 
found in opposite 
direction) 
Hypothesis 2b Individualism was expected to moderate the relation 
between information sharing content and team 
performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between 
information exchange and team performance was 
expected for teams that scored high on Individualism than 
for teams that scored low on Individualism. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2c Individualism was expected to moderate the relation 
between information sharing content and team 
performance.  Specifically, a higher correlation between 
team reinforcement/punishment and team performance is 
expected for teams scoring higher on Individualism than 
for teams scoring lower on Individualism. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3 Power Distance is expected to moderate the relation 
between information sharing content and team 
performance.  Specifically, a higher correlation between 
directing tasks and team performance is expected for 
teams scoring higher on Power Distance than for teams 
scoring lower on Power Distance. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 4a Uncertainty Avoidance is expected to moderate the 
relation between information sharing content and team 
performance.  Specifically, a higher correlation between 
planning and team performance is expected for teams 
scoring higher on Uncertainty Avoidance than for teams 
scoring lower on Uncertainty Avoidance. 
Not Supported 
Hypothesis 4b Uncertainty Avoidance is expected to moderate the 
relation between information sharing content and team 
performance. Specifically, a higher correlation between 
situation update and team performance is expected for 
teams scoring higher on Uncertainty Avoidance than for 






To fully understand how culture related to information sharing and team performance in 
this study, I will provide an abridged overview of the culture scores and communication-pattern 
differences within each country.   
Culture 
 The cultural variables of interest in this study were Individualism, Power Distance, and 
Uncertainty Avoidance. As reported earlier in this paper, the three culture variables were highly 
correlated, suggesting that the measures do not represent separate constructs.  Thus, I will report 
information sharing differences based on Individualism only. 
Information Sharing  
Seven information sharing dimensions were coded in this study: Task Direction, Situation 
Update, Planning, Supporting Behavior, Information Exchange, Team 
Reinforcement/Punishment, and Other Communications.  With the exception of Supporting 
Behavior, these information sharing dimensions were strongly correlated (p < .05).  Although the 
total amount of communication was significantly related to team performance (r = 0.33, p < 
0.05), the only coded dimension that was related to team performance was Situation Update (r = 
0.42, p < 0.01). In addition to correlations, I also examined the total number of information 
sharing statements by country and culture.   
To examine total information sharing, I calculated team-level minimum, maximum, and 
average scores of total IS by Nationality (and rank for Norway).  The results can be found in 
Table 18.  The teams from the USA had the highest Individualism score and the highest 
maximum IS messages of all of the teams (698 statements).  However, the Netherlands NATO 
teams, with the second highest Individualism score, had the highest mean IS score (511.75 
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statements).  Bulgaria, the least individualistic country in the study, had the lowest team 
minimum frequency (29 statements), lowest maximum team score (168 statements) and lowest 
mean (114.38 statements).  When examining mean differences in total IS, I conducted a One-
Way Analysis of Variance and found that there were significant information sharing differences 
among countries (F (4, 43) = 12.73, p < .00). The eta-squared (ŋ
2
) was calculated by dividing the 
Sum of Squares Between Groups by the Sum of Squares Total to yield the effect size of this 
analysis.  The ŋ
2
 was .28, suggesting that 28% of the variance in team performance was 
accounted for by nationality. 
 Table 15. Cultural Values, Information Sharing, and Performance Data by Country 
 
With an Individualism score that was the second lowest in the study sample, Norway was 
the only country that had teams with different ranks.  Though not a focus in this study, there 
were distinct information sharing differences when examining the junior- versus senior-Officer 
teams.  Specifically, the junior teams had a higher minimum, maximum, and mean information 
sharing frequency as compared to their senior counterparts.  These findings can be found in 
Table 16.  To further understand if there were statistical Information Sharing differences between 
ranks, an Analysis of Variance was conducted.  The result was that there was a statistical 















Norway  8 31 69 50 153 362 258.5 150 800 406.25 
Norway  8 31 69 50 322 666 454.5 0 1150 733.75 
Sweden  9 31 71 29 262 658 402.67 150 1950 760 
USA  7 40 91 46 286 698 464 900 1690 1235.71 
Netherlands  8 38 80 53 361 653 511.75 500 1250 1001.25 
Bulgaria  8 70 30 85 29 168 114.38 250 1650 746.25 
 
81 
significant difference in total IS between senior and junior Norwegian Officers (F (1, 14) = 
13.70, p < .01). 
Table 16. Rank Differences in Total Statements for Norwegian Officers 
Variable N Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Senior Norwegian 
Officer Teams 
8 258.50 75.36 153 362 
Junior Norwegian 
Officer Teams 
8 454.50 129.43 322 666 
 
When separating the experimental task into three equal temporal phases—beginning, 
middle, and end, there are some unique communication differences exhibited by culture.  To 
examine these information sharing differences, I visually examined a data set from each country 
that reflected the closest total information sharing frequency as the country’s mean index (among 
all teams within each country), as detailed in Table 17. These data were intended to provide an 
overview of information sharing differences by nationality. Interestingly, when taking a sample 
of information sharing data from each country, those that are more individualistic (Sweden, 
USA, and the Netherlands), as determined by a median split, exhibited the same pattern of 
communication when examining the most coded information sharing content area in the three 
aforementioned phases.  That is, when examining the frequency of information sharing content 
by time phase, the highest percentage of communication was Planning for the beginning phase, 
and Situation Update for the middle and end phases for the more Individualistic teams. Bulgaria, 
the most collectivist country, most frequently engaged in Planning for all three phases.  The 
other collectivist country, although not as collectivist as Bulgaria, is Norway.  As found in total 
IS, the Norwegian teams differed by rank level, but not as expected.  The senior-ranked 
Norwegian Officers relied on Planning for the beginning phase, Situation Update for the middle, 
 
82 
and Task Direction for the end phase. However, the information sharing patterns by the junior 
Norwegian Officers mirrored those from the senior officers from individualist cultures—
Planning for the beginning, and Situation Update for the middle and end phases.
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Table 17. Information Sharing Differences by Temporal Phase 
 
 
















 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N %  
Norway Beg 21 24.14 13 14.94 29 33.33 0 0.00 21 24.14 1 1.15 2 2.30 87 100.00 Planning 
 









Beg 26 18.44 28 19.86 51 36.17 0 0.00 24 17.02 0 0.00 12 8.51 141 100.00 Planning 
 




End 44 31.21 67 47.52 1 0.71 2 1.42 14 9.93 7 4.96 6 4.26 141 100.00 
Situation 
Update 
Sweden Beg 19 14.96 16 12.60 45 35.43 0 0.00 40 31.50 2 1.57 5 3.94 127 100.00 Planning 
 




End 34 26.56 66 51.56 6 4.69 0 0.00 22 17.19 0 0.00 0 0.00 128 100.00 
Situation 
Update 
USA Beg 21 15.79 33 24.81 51 38.35 0 0.00 21 15.79 0 0.00 7 5.26 133 100.00 Planning 
 









Beg 15 8.67 20 11.56 86 49.71 0 0.00 19 10.98 4 2.31 29 16.76 173 100.00 Planning 
 




End 28 16.18 111 64.16 0 0.00 0 0.00 18 10.40 6 3.47 10 5.78 173 100.00 
Situation 
Update 
Bulgaria Beg 6 18.18 1 3.03 15 45.45 0 0.00 9 27.27 0 0.00 2 6.06 33 100.00 Planning 
 
Mid 9 28.13 1 3.13 18 56.25 0 0.00 4 12.50 0 0.00 0 0.00 32 100.00 Planning 
 





I examined whether there were mean differences in team performance based on 
Nationality of the teams.  The results of the Analysis of Variance concluded that there were 
mean differences in team performance when analyzed with Nationality as a factor (F (4, 43) = 
4.23, p = .01).  More information regarding the different Nationality’s team performance data 
can be found in Table 18. 
 
Table 18. Descriptives of Team Performance based on Nationality 
Variable N M SD Minimum Maximum 
Norway 16 570.00 340.78 0 1150 
Sweden 9 760.00 523.62 150 1950 
USA 7 1235.71 346.69 900 1690 
Netherlands 8 1001.25 249.14 500 1250 
Bulgaria 8 746.25 439.77 250 1650 
Total 48 803.96 437.13 0 1950 
 
Bonferroni post-hoc analyses were conducted to examine the nature of the mean 
differences.  I separated the Norwegian senior officer teams from the junior officer teams for the 
analyses (F (5, 42) = 4.14, p = .00).  The results of the post-hoc analyses clarified the significant 
differences among the senior Norwegian, American and the Dutch NATO Officer teams.  
Specifically, the American and Dutch teams’ mean performance were significantly greater than 




CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine how culture relates to information 
sharing and team performance.  To reflect on team research, the Input-Process-Output (I-P-O) 
model is often used to examine relations among variables of interest.  However, the I-P-O model 
was developed with a Western view and this study provided some support to its transfer to other 
cultures.  In this study, a moderated model of the interactive effects of information sharing and 
culture on team performance was examined. Investigating homogeneous teams is not only a 
needed study objective for culture research, but it is a prerequisite in understanding how 
information sharing is unique within culture.  Moreover, in order to understand how to 
effectively share information among teammates from various cultures, it is important to 
understand how communication is dictated by their native culture. The homogeneous-teams 
approach allows researchers to attribute the information sharing patterns to the culture, reducing 
the culture confound in heterogeneous teams. Thus, this study provides an examination of 
within- and between-culture analysis of team information sharing among teams composed of 
NATO Officers.   
Information Sharing & Team Performance 
As reflected in the extant literature, information sharing was related to team performance.  
The results of the data analyses showed that most of the information sharing content areas was 
strongly correlated and related to both team performance and culture. Although the total amount 
of messages exchanged was significantly related to team performance, the only coded 
information sharing dimension that was related to team performance was Situation Update.  The 
literature suggests that providing and requesting Situation Updates is a direct significant team 
process that predicts expert team performance (Smith-Jentsch et al., 2001).  Research has 
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consistently shown that having information sharing that focuses on the current state of the 
mission allows for clarification for team members and for strategy development to increase 
effective decision making and performance.  Furthermore, consistent situation updates facilitate 
more dynamic mission planning, and subsequently improve Warfighter performance.  Smith-
Jentsch et al. (2001) suggest that Situation Updates are especially crucial for teams that have to 
make critical decisions under extreme time pressures.  The NATO Officer population that was 
used in this study is one such career field that possesses such team characteristics; therefore, it is 
understandable why this relation was significant in this study. 
Although the information sharing findings are consistent with the established literature, it 
was expected that the other coded information sharing content variables (or at least a subset) 
would have demonstrated some statistically-significant relations with team performance as 
demonstrated in literature (Rosen, 2005).  Yet, when considered in military context, the results 
reflect the current military information sharing protocol.  As previously stated, team research 
conducted in the military, and in similar career fields like the medical community, has 
overwhelmingly reported the importance of Situation Update provisions to and requests from 
teammates to enhance team performance (Smith-Jentsch, et al., 2001).  In fact, many team 
training courses, like Team Dimensional Training, in the United States emphasize the importance 
of situation updates, especially from junior to senior members.  And even though these team 
information sharing techniques are trained in the United States, it is interesting that these results 
apparently translate to teams from other countries.  In this study, the teams that were among the 
higher performance scores were those that engaged in situation update during the middle and end 
of the mission (e.g., Sweden).  The teams composed of senior Norwegian and Bulgarian Officers 
were the only teams to not have Situation Update as their most frequent information sharing 
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dimension for the middle and end of the mission.  Additionally, these teams had the lowest total 
IS (as measured by mean, minimum, and maximum) and are among the lower team performance 
scores; thus, these results support the positive information sharing-team performance relations 
previously published in the literature. 
Cultural Impact 
This study underscored that culture mattered.  The data analyses conducted for this study 
were directed at examining the interactive effects of culture on various information sharing 
content areas and team performance, as depicted in Figure 8.  The hypothesized relations 
involving Power Distance and Individualism were statistically significant.  Specifically, Task 
Direction had a positive association with team performance for high-Power Distance teams and 
the opposite relation for their low-scoring culture counterparts.   
Individualists had a tendency to communicate more than those lower on this cultural 
scale.  Also, positive relations between team performance and Information Exchange and 
Reinforcement / Punishment were observed for high-Individualist teams, but negative relations 
for teams scoring low on this cultural value. Although these interactions were significant, the 
finding regarding Supporting Behavior was in the opposite direction as proposed. It was 
hypothesized that information sharing statements targeting supporting behavior would be 
positively related to team performance, and that this relation would be exacerbated for those 
teams that scored low on Individualism than those that scored high.  Instead, the interaction was 
indeed significant, but after examining the plot, the data showed that the relation between 
Supporting Behavior and Team performance was positive for high-Individualist teams, and 
negative for low-Individualist teams. Thus, the results indicate that Supporting Behavior was 
associated with inferior team performance for low-Individualist teams. The high Individualists 
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engaged in more information sharing and also more Supporting Behavior.  Because the low 
Individualists engaged in less frequent information sharing, it can be expected that their 
information sharing would be focused more on mission planning than on Supporting Behavior.  
If the low Individualists used some of their infrequent statements to include Supporting 
Behavior, it can be expected that these messages would not substitute other mission-critical 
messages; consequently, the information sharing would have a negative relation with team 
performance.  Additionally, low Individualists engage in more high-context communication and 
can be assumed that the Supporting Behavior experienced by such culture would be nonverbal 
and not captured in this study. 
The interactions involving Uncertainty Avoidance were not statistically significant—
neither Planning nor Situation Update was moderated by this cultural variable.  The data suggest 
that Planning was not related to team performance and this relation did not change with the 
introduction of culture. Situation Update, however, was significantly related to team performance 
and Uncertainty Avoidance did not strengthen this relation.   The sample size was small (n =48), 
providing low power, which possibly prevented statistical significant findings for the 
hypothesized relations regarding Uncertainty Avoidance.  If there were more teams involved, it 
would lend the opportunity to provide more conclusive responses to these hypotheses.  
Mission Strategy 
When exploring the information sharing differences, there were insightful trends that 
facilitated the understanding of differing mission strategies adopted by high- versus low-
Individualists.  Although not hypothesized, a distinct pattern of communication over the course 
of the task was observed.  When the task was divided in three phases, low-Individualists engaged 
more in Planning in all three phases, whereas high-Individualists began the task with frequent 
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statements about Planning, but used Situation Updates more as time went on.  These 
communication strategies should be recognized and can also account for why high-
Individualists’ performance was superior, as Situation Update was the only information sharing 
content that was significantly related to team performance.   
Limitations 
Although many of the results were as expected, there were some hypotheses and findings 
that were not supported.   This study only had 48 teams of participants, which could be a 
contributing factor to having insufficient statistical power.  That is, if there were more 
participants and teams involved in the study, the hypotheses regarding Uncertainty Avoidance 
and the relations among information sharing and team performance may have resulted in 
different statistical findings.  However, it should be reinforced that even with a small sample 
size, the moderated hypotheses regarding Individualism and Power Distance were observed as 
expected—underscoring the strength of these relations. 
The cultural values measure by Hofstede has gained much attention by critics for its 
development and psychometric properties.  The findings from the cultural values analyses would 
suggest that the three dimensions (i.e., Individualism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty 
Avoidance) that were initially conceptualized as separate constructs, were highly correlated, 
inferring that there may be one culture construct.  Additionally, in this study, the cultural value 
score was assigned to the team based on their nationality.  These scores are based on national 
levels and eliminate the variability presented by collecting cultural values for each individual and 
aggregating these values to represent the team score.  Moreover, assigning these team-level 
scores that are based on actual national scores reported by Hofstede (www.geert-hofstede.com) 
may not reflect the individual cultural values of the participants.  For example, to assign a score 
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for a participant who is representing the United States prevents the opportunity to measure the 
variability in values of those from the four corners of the country.  We can assume that the 
values of a participant from New York can differ from those of a participant from Mississippi, 
Florida, and California.  Thus, relying on a national score to represent the cultural values of a 
four-participant team may not provide an accurate appreciation of the team culture. 
Another limitation related to culture was that the participants involved in this study were 
representing countries that scored high on Individualism.  Bulgaria was the only country that 
could be truly considered low on Individualism.  The purpose of this study was not to highlight 
team performance differences, but the behavior variations in the information sharing because 
hypotheses regarding performance were not considered.  It was envisioned that the conclusion of 
the study would be that although different cultures communicate differently, they still perform 
equally—taking more of a criterion dimensionality approach.  Unfortunately, there was 
performance differences observed. In general, the individualist countries performed better on this 
task than the collectivist.  Taken together, in agreement with previous research, information 
sharing (specifically, the total frequency and the Situation Update dimension) was related to 
team performance.  Moreover, these relations were exacerbated for those teams that represented 
countries from Individualist cultures.  These findings would suggest that Individualists perform 
better on team tasks, which seems counterintuitive.  However, when scrutinizing the 
experimental method and task requirements, this study’s team task is designed to facilitate better 
performance from individualist teams more than would be expected from a true collectivist team. 
These findings are in accordance with literature on direct and low-context communication.  It is 
expected that if the task requires participants to solely engage in computer-based text 
communication, then those who are more fluent in direct, low-context information sharing (i.e., 
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Individualists) will engage more within said task and will score high in total IS (which was 
related to team performance).  For more clarification, this task required team members to engage 
in direct communication, low-context information sharing that is more aligned with 
Individualists’ style. Thus, these results, albeit informative, should be considered with caution 
and cannot generalize to any team task in a cross-cultural environment.   
Strengths 
The participants in this study were NATO Officers from various countries.  This study 
required the collaboration of many researchers to conduct the experiment in their respective 
countries, which underscores its contribution to cross-cultural research.  The experiment allowed 
researchers to effectively examine how culture is related to information sharing and team 
performance. 
Although the laboratory task may not be generalizable to real-world tasks and may have 
disadvantaged low Individualists by eliminating nonverbals, information sharing expectations in 
this task were relevant to the tasking that NATO Officers experience in their job.  Moreover, the 
task required all teams to type in English (one of NATO’s official languages), even if it was not 
their native language.  Because the vast majority of communication is non-verbal (Ferraro & 
Andreatta, 2010), limiting the information sharing to text-typing provides a deficiency in the 
information sharing criterion and facilitates an advantage to low-context cultures.  But the digital 
age has required teams to rely more on typed communication with email and text messages to 
keep abreast on the team task across time zones. Because, much can be lost in translation in 
verbal information sharing, it may require teams to engage in more information sharing for 
clarification and mission planning.  Because the total IS was related in team performance in this 
study, this finding supports the need to engage in more text communication in a virtual 
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environment.  Thus, this team task corresponds to the current state of team information sharing 
processes that face our current military demands.  Further, this study allows the audience to 
understand how cultures differ in information sharing and team performance while considering 
the current nature of missions.   
Future Research 
One major research effort that should be addressed is the lack of an empirically-based 
measure of culture.  Future research should be directed at developing a more advanced culture 
measure that addresses the critiques of the Hofstede measure.  Specifically, future research 
should be dedicated to understanding the multidimensional concept of culture and developing a 
measure that is validated by a globally-representative sample.  Moreover, the data from cultural 
values presented by Hofstede were highly correlated, which suggests that there are not separate 
dimensions but just one measure of culture.  Cross-cultural researchers should examine 
independent operationalizations of culture that strengthens the current literature on culture. 
Similarly, there is a need for more sophisticated, behavior-based information sharing 
coding system, especially for digital communication.  There should be an emphasis on what 
information is unique versus redundant in the team communications.  Specifically, researchers 
should quantitatively index the ratio of unique to redundant information sharing and how these 
messages relate to team performance. There is an expectation that the greater proportion of 
unique information that is shared, the better the teams will perform.  With a revised information 
sharing coding system that measures these messages, the hypotheses in this study can be 
readdressed and more clarification of whether culture trumps unique information sharing in 
homogeneous teams can be appraised.  For example, do high Individualists share more unique 
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information than low Individualists? Is Individualism a significant moderator when unique 
information is coded? 
Team scientists should also consider manipulating the task to include various levels of 
interdependency and mission urgency.  For example, military missions involving having a 
planning meeting with local leaders while drinking chai tea has different information sharing and 
culture implications than when the mission is task focused on piloting an unmanned aerial 
vehicle for a tactical air strike.  The former task has less task interdependency and requires more 
cross-cultural competence for success.  The latter mission features greater urgency, risk, stress 
and time demands that can result in catastrophes if the mission is compromised.  With these task 
characteristics, the military personnel are dependent less on culture, but on the mission 
requirements.  It can be hypothesized that under some task conditions, other demographic data 
(e.g., rank, education) may trump culture. Thus, future researchers should consider such task 
characteristics to provide guidance for what tasks culture matters more and what personal 
characteristics are needed. 
Future team researchers should also consider developing their studies to collect data at 
various levels (e.g., individual, team, and national) to allow for more sophisticated data analyses. 
Data analysis techniques like Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) are appropriate for such 
studies and are increasingly gaining attention in team research.  Using data analysis techniques 
that analyze nested variables encourages the understanding of the unique contributions provided 
by each level. Researchers should anticipate employing this and other emerging analyses for 




The results of this study provide practical implications for people who work in similar 
careers to the military environments (e.g., first responders, medical teams, etc.).  Employees need 
to remember the importance of sharing unique information when working in teams.  More 
information that is shared among the team is related to improved team performance.  However, 
employees should know that collaborating with team members from other cultures may not be 
similar to when working with those from the same culture. These collaborative working 
relationships may require trust to facilitate the IS needed for mission success (Hughes, McCoy, 
& Johnston, 2009; Hughes, McCoy, Severe, & Johnston, 2010; McCoy-Fisher, Severe, & 
Hughes, 2011; McCoy-Fisher, Hughes, & Severe, 2012).  Specifically, culturally-distant team 
members may engage in indirect, high-context communication that may not be transparent for 
Westerners.   
Team members should engage in an introduction that allows for teammates to identify 
their strengths, weaknesses, and expertise in attacking the team task.  In this study, the more 
effective teams engaged in Planning in the beginning of the mission, where tasks and roles were 
divided. These effective teams did not spend the rest of the mission in Planning mode, but more 
in providing or requesting Situation Updates. This orientation in the beginning of the task may 
have to occur quickly in the field because of the time pressures associated with their decision 
making and mission, but the benefits of this short exchange may serve as a critical force 
multiplier in intense missions.  This introduction can be compared to having a thorough pre-
brief, where mission overview, goals, and planning take place—common for military teams.  
Finally, more recent technology advancements have been considered by multinational 
corporations to augment the high-context environments.  Specifically, there has been an increase 
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of live virtual feeds of office spaces in various countries which allows the employees to interact 
as if they are sharing their daily workspace with their international-counterparts.  For example, 
there are mobile desks with a screen to project the office in a European location and the ability to 
talk directly to team members in a globally-distributed team.  With the internet and video 
conferencing capabilities, these tools can enhance both high- and low- context communication, 
alleviate the ineffective information sharing, and encourage effective decision making. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study highlighted the relations among culture, information sharing, 
and team performance and provided support for the transfer of the Western-developed team I-P-
O model to other cultures.  Although total information sharing was related to Team Performance 
and culture (Power Distance, Individualism, and Uncertainty Avoidance), Situation Update was 
the only coded information sharing variable related to team performance.  The effective teams 
exchanged more information and teams that were similar in cultural values engaged in similar 
information sharing during the beginning, middle, and end of the missions.  Additionally, 
Individualism and Power Distance were significant moderators for Information Sharing content, 
but not Uncertainty Avoidance.  Limitations, contributions and practical implications were 













Statements that include provisions 
or requests about instructing team 
members of how to proceed in the 
task. 
“Go ahead William.” 
“Scan it.” 
“Let’s move on.” 
“Click on dude and give a final 
report.” 
“Frank or Jacob, pick up the high 
fidelity sensor.”  
“We will start at 1st and 2nd 
avenue.” 
“Jacob and Frank will start on 2nd 
avenue.”  






Statements that include provisions 
or requests about what the 
teammate(s) are currently doing in 
the mission. 
 “William, are you still 
conscious?” 
“Do you have tips you can 
share?”  
“You can see me on map” 
“The purple dot on 2nd street” 
3. 
 Update on the 
Simulation / Task 
Statements that include provisions 
or requests of recently-acquired 
information about the task or 
mission. 
“Did you scan the door yet?” 
“Did everyone give a final status 
report?” 
“There can be a bomb.”  
“Only one lock pick.”  
“Can you unpick the lock?” 
“Do you have information about 
weapon?” 




Statements that include provisions 
or requests about team’s 
performance status in the mission. 
“I marked it” 
“You just scored 100 goodwill 
points” 
“Goodwill 1150” 





Statements that include provisions 
or requests on how teammate(s) 
should divide the team 
responsibilities. 
“We will make two teams” 
“William and Nathan will be on 
team one.” 
“You are leader.” 
“What are going to be teams?” 
“Who is team one?” 
6.  
Goal setting 
Statements that include provisions 
or requests about goals for the team 
or specific actions team member’s 
need to take to address a goal. 
“The goal is to search as many 
locations as possible”  
“The objective is to gain many 
gw points” 









Statements that include provisions 
or requests about strategy for task 
performance. 
 These statements are more firm 
declarations as compared to Task 
Option Generation Statements. 
“Okay, so what is our plan?” 
“Let one team start from first 
avenue.” 
“Now, this is our communication 





Statements that include provisions 
or requests about potential 
solutions to a problem. These 
statements are more suggestions 
and questions rather than Strategy 
statements. 
“Can we start on 3rd avenue and 
search in a clockwise direction?” 
“I am just suggesting as the team 
leader that he is.” 





Statements that include provisions 
of support to team member(s) or 
requests for help by team 
member(s).  
“We need help” 
“Help me” 





Statements that express agreement 
with no rationale provided.   







Statements that express 
disagreement with no rationale 
provided.   
“I think that you are wrong.” 
 “No.” 
12. 
 Uncertainty / 
Indifference 
Uncertainty statements explicitly 
express either general or specific 
uncertainty about the roles, tasks, 
situations, or anything else task-
related. 
“Heck, I don’t know” 
“I don’t care who is on my team.” 
13. 
 Greetings 









Statements that have no 
grammatical connection to 
surrounding statements and 










Statements that are positive 
comments on the nature of the 
experiment, team experience, and / 
or team performance.  
 
Statements that are pleasant facial 
expressions pictorially represented 
by punctuation and letters. 
“Thank you all for participating.” 
“It was a pleasure for me to play 
with you.” 
“You were great.” 
















Statements that focus on 
expressing negative opinion about 
the nature of the experiment, team 
experience, and / or team 
performance. 
 
Statements that are unpleasant 
facial expressions pictorially 
represented by punctuation and 
letters. 
“That really sucked.” 








Statements that have no explicit 
meaning because they are missing 
one or more critical components of 
grammar: subjects, verbs, or 
objects.  
 
Statements that are words spoken 
to fill gaps.   
 
Statements that cannot be coded in 












The background questionnaire is a pre-game survey. Included below is a screenshot of 





















If Other, please specify. 
  
 
How many years have you lived in this country? 
  
 
How many languages do you speak? 
  
 
List the languages you speak. 
  
 
What is the highest degree you have completed? 
 High School or equivalent 
 Associate Degree or 2 years after high school 
 Bachelor's Degree or equivalent 
 Master's Degree or equivalent 
 PhD or doctorate equivalent 
 


















How would you rate your ability to read and write in English? 




 Very Fluent 
 




feel that you get more easily stressed when working in an English-speaking environment 
rather than in your native language? 





 Very Often 
 
become more reserved about presenting your point of view in English than in your native 
language? 





 Very Often 
 
Computer and Game Experience 
  
 
What is your overall level of computer expertise? 
 Low    : Seldom use computers 
 Medium: Use computers often and are comfortable with them 
 High   : Use computers a lot and feel very comfortable about my abilities 
 










































 Don't use 
 
Do you own or use often any of the following game consoles (check all that apply)? 
 Playstation 1 or 2 
 Xbox 
 Gamecube 
 Personal Computer 
 














What computer games, if any, do you most often play? 
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